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Abstract 
In a tort law regime established on the basis of corrective justice considerations, causation 
requirements will tend to play a predominant role in regulating the damages claims brought 
forward. The requirement of the causal link between the harm suffered and the 
anticompetitive conduct in damages claims for infringement of EU competition law has 
nevertheless received remarkably little attention in the recently adopted EU Damages 
Directive and in academic literature. The Damages Directive and some recent case law of 
the Court of Justice of the EU proceed to some limited harmonization of evidential 
presumptions and procedural requirements, as well as the exclusion of national rules that 
may deny the right of the parties harmed by the competition law infringement to receive 
compensation. Yet, the contours of the requirement of causal link are left to the interpretative 
work of national courts, in view of their respective tort law doctrines on causation and the 
lack of a proper EU tort law. The study first explores the role of the concept of causation in 
claims for damages for infringement of EU competition law and the different approaches 
taken by the legal systems of EU Member States in conceptualizing the inquiry of a causal 
link. It then focuses on the methods used by the tort law systems of the EU Member States, 
the recent Damages Directive and the case law of the EU Court to engage with situations of 
causal uncertainty, which may frequently arise in the context of competition law actions for 
damages, in view of the complexity of the commercial environment and the multiple factors 
influencing markets.  
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I. Introduction 
In Courage Ltd v Crehan1 , the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) expressly 
recognized the existence of a right to claim damages on the basis of the direct effect of the 
provisions of EU competition law.  In doing so, the CJEU planted the first seeds of what 
would constitute one of the most remarkable reforms in the five decades of EU competition 
law enforcement - introducing damages claims for the infringement of EU and national 
competition law2. In Manfredi, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) proclaimed 
the right for any individual to claim compensation for the harm suffered “where there is a 
causal relationship between that harm and an agreement or practice prohibited” under 
Article 101 TFEU (and/or Article 102 TFEU)3. The Court did not elaborate further on the 
requirement of a causal link, but simply referred to “the legal system of each Member State 
to prescribe the detailed rules governing the exercise of [the] right [to damages], including 
those on the application of the concept of ‘causal relationship’ between an antitrust 
infringement and the harm suffered”, “provided that the principles of equivalence and 
effectiveness are observed”4. The recently voted Directive of the European Parliament and 
the Council on certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for 
infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the European 
Union (hereinafter Damages Directive), stipulates in its Article 3 that “Member States shall 
ensure that any natural or legal person who has suffered harm caused by an infringement of 
competition law is able to claim and to obtain full compensation for that harm”5. 
 
The conferral of standing in EU law to anyone harmed by a competition law infringement 
opens theoretically the gates to a flood of claims for damages initiated by those having 
suffered damages. Yet, the analysis of all the published competition law damages cases in 
the four most important jurisdictions in the European Union, in terms of the size of their 
economy, from 1999 to 2013 indicates that the overwhelming majority of damages claims 
leading to court judgments has been initiated by direct purchasers and competitors, with a 
handful of cases being initiated by other groups of claimants, such as indirect purchasers, 
which may seem rather odd for a remedy perceived as aiming to provide full compensation 
to those affected by a competition law infringement. 
 
The reasons for this poor representation of certain categories of claimants may include the 
relative uncertainty until recently in some jurisdictions of the standing of indirect purchasers.  
In addition, the absence of proper collective redress systems in most EU Member States has 
                                                          
1
 Case C-453/99, Courage Ltd v Bernard Crehan and Bernard Crehan v Courage Ltd and Others [2001] ECR I-
6297. 
2
 For an historical perspective, see, among others, V. Milutinovic, The Right to Damages under EU Competition 
Law: From Courage v. Crehan to the White paper and beyond (Kluwer Law International, 2010). 
3
 Joined Cases C-295/04 to C-298/04, Manfredi & others [2006] ECR I-6619, paras 61-63. See also, Case C-
199/11, Europese Gemeenschap v Otis NV [2013] ECR [not yet published], paras 43-44 (noting the role of the 
national courts in civil proceedings for damages, to determine the damage and the causal link between the 
infringement and the damage). 
4
 Joined Cases C-295/04 to C-298/04, Manfredi & others [2006] ECR I-6619, para. 64.  
5
 Directive 2014/104/EU of the European Parliament and the Council on certain rules governing actions for 
damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of 
the European Union (hereinafter Damages Directive), [2014] OJ L349/1 (emphasis added). 
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also clearly been a very significant factor.6 The standing issue resolved, for the future, the 
question is whether we will see a litigation flood. Whether we do may result from the central 
role played by the aim of compensation (and more broadly corrective justice) in the legal 
framework in Europe on actions for competition law damages. An approach focusing on 
compensation and corrective justice requires that causation be proven and this will inevitably 
become a central issue in actions for damages for competition law infringements, eventually 
regulating the extent of competition damages litigation in Europe7.  
 
Surprisingly, causation has received remarkably little attention, as neither the preparatory 
works for the Damages Directive, nor subsequent legal commentary, have paid any attention 
to it8. The issue is not, as such, discussed in the Damages Directive (although it is indirectly 
touched upon with the establishment of a causal presumption for cartel harm) and the Court 
of Justice of the EU (CJEU) refused to develop a common EU law based framework on 
causality in Kone, despite being invited to it by its Advocate General9, thus leaving the task 
to national legal systems of general tort law. 
 
I will first address the role of the concept of causation in claims for damages for infringement 
of competition law and discuss the different approaches taken by the legal systems of EU 
Member States in conceptualizing the inquiry of a causal link (II). I will then focus on the 
methods used by the tort law systems of the EU Member States, the recent Damages 
Directive and the case law of the EU court to engage with situations of causal uncertainty, 
which may frequently arise in the context of competition law actions for damages, in view of 
the commercial environment and the multiple factors influencing markets (III). A conclusion 
follows (IV). 
 
                                                          
6
 For example, Which? brought the first UK representative action for damages against JJB sports in 2007 on 
behalf of consumers who purchased football shirts at cartelised prices in 2000-2001, following an OFT 
infringement decision in 2003.  However, as Which describe “as we had to operate under an opt-in system, the 
number of consumers opting in was very low considering the degree of publicity, the amount of resources we 
spent and the external legal costs.” See http://www.which.co.uk/documents/pdf/collective-redress-case-study-
which-briefing-258401.pdf     
7
 Law and economics scholars question the central role of causation in tort actions by taking an ex ante 
perspective based on the concept of efficiency. They advance the view that responsibility should be imposed on 
the person best placed to avoid the loss most cheaply (cost avoidance theory): see, Guido Calabresi & Jon T. 
Hirchsoff, Towards a Test in Strict Liability in Torts, (1972) 71 Yale L J 1055; Richard A. Posner, Strict 
Liability: A Comment, (1973) 2 Journal of Legal Studies 205. They also consider that the creation of an 
increased risk of some harm in these circumstances would constitute causation of that harm, thus subjecting the 
question of actual causation to policy consideration with regard to the “efficient” attribution of responsibility. 
According to this view, an actor is held liable if he fails to take care when the burden of care (Bc) is less than the 
outcome of the probability of loss (pL) and the amount of the loss (aL) (e.g. Bc˂pLaL, that is that is (Bc) is less 
than the sum of (pLaL)). Other law and economic scholars advance a different positive economics rather than 
normative economics perspective, taking less a forward-looking approach and focusing more on the study of 
incentives affected by the test of factual causation applied, thus emphasizing the role of the factual causation 
inquiry: see, for instance, Mark F. Grady, A New Positive Economic Theory of Negligence, (1983) 92 Yale Law 
Journal 799-829. For a discussion of these different perspectives in law and economics literature, see Keith 
Hylton, Causation in Tort Law: A Reconsideration in Jennifer Arlen (eds.) Research Handbook on the 
Economics of Torts (Edward Elgar, 2013) 97-113. 
8
 For an exception, see Hanns A. Adele, Georg E. Kodek, G.K. Schaefer, Proving Causation in Private Antitrust 
Cases, (2012) 7(4) Journal of Competition Law and Economics 847-869. 
9
 Case c-557/12, Kone AG and Others v ÖBB-Infrastruktur AG [June 5th, 2014]. 
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II. Unpacking the requirement of a causal link in actions for damages for 
competition law infringement 
A. Setting the stage: the role of causation in actions for damages for infringement of 
competition law 
The requirement of causation is a common feature of tort law in the EU Member States for 
damages actions10. Causation requirements have also been inherent in the development of 
the substantive provisions of EU competition law, beyond the context of a claim for 
damages11. Causation can be part of the liability analysis (in order to establish the 
infringement of competition law), as well as an inherent part of damages analysis. This paper 
will focus on the second aspect. 
 
Causation was among the issues put forward by the European Commission in its Green 
paper on damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules as a possible factor having an 
impact on the development of antitrust damages claims in Europe, although the Commission 
kept away from making any specific suggestions on this topic.12 The Commission Staff 
Working paper, annexed to the Green paper, highlighted three challenges arising out of the 
application of the concept of causation in actions for damages for infringement of EU 
competition law.  
 
First, proving a causal link in antitrust damages cases “will often require complex economic 
analysis based on a large number of facts and economic data”, thus hinting to the practical 
and theoretical challenges arising out of the import of the concept of economic causality in a 
legal and factual setting13.  
 
Second, the legal systems of Member States adopt different approaches with regard to the 
legal concept of causation: an issue that was also highlighted in the European Commission’s 
commissioned study on the conditions of claims for damages for infringement of EU 
competition law14. The Commission, however, observed that the application of these 
concepts in concrete cases “will not lead to widely diverging results and that the concepts 
derive from the legal culture of the jurisdictions in question more than to actual differences in 
                                                          
10
 See, Christian von Bar, Causation or Attribution, in The Common European Law of Torts: Volume Two 
(Oxford University Press, 2000), 433-498; Isabel C. Durant, Causation, in Helmut Koziol & Reiner Schulze 
(eds.), Tort Law of the European Community (Wien: Springer, 2010), 47-80. 
11
 The development of the counterfactual method constitutes to that respect an illustration of the importance of 
causation in EU competition law: Ioannis Lianos, Causation in EU Substantive Competition Law (forth. CLES 
Research paper 5/2014); More generally on the rise of the counterfactual method in EU competition law, 
Damien Geradin & Ianis Girgenson, The Counterfactual Method in EU Competition Law: The Cornerstone of 
the Effects-Based Approach (December 11, 2011). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1970917 ; 
Antonio Bavasso & Alistair Lindsay, Causation in EC Merger Control, (2007) 3 (2) Journal of Competition Law 
& Economics, 181-202. Of particular interest, with regard to this issue, is the way EU competition law deals 
with attempts of anticompetitive practices (see, Ioannis Lianos, Causation in EU Substantive Competition Law 
(forth. CLES Research paper 5/2014) 
12
 European Commission, Green paper - Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, SEC(2005) 1732, 
question N. 
13
 European Commission, Green paper - Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, SEC(2005) 1732, 
question N. 
14
 See also, Ashurst, Study on the conditions of claims for damages in case of infringement of EC competition 
rules, Comparative Report, August 31, 2004. 
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appreciation”15. For this reason, and more generally because of the important role played by 
the case law in this context, the Commission Staff Working paper did not consider that any 
harmonization action was necessary in this field in order to facilitate damages claims. One 
should also keep in mind the harmonization initiatives currently considered, at the aftermaths 
of the publication of the Common Frame of Reference16 and the option for a European Civil 
Code17.  
 
Third, the Commission stressed that the application of a given national law on causation 
should not lead to the exclusion of groups of victims of anti-competitive behaviour from 
recovering their losses, hence compromising the objective of effective competition law 
enforcement.  
 
The application of the national requirements for causation is subject to the double discipline 
of the principles of equivalence and effectiveness, and in particular the second principle, 
which, as the Commission staff paper highlights, may “influence” notions of causation as 
existing in national civil law and eventually lead to their clarification so as to facilitate 
damages actions further18. Yet, no concrete proposals, as to how this influence will be 
exercised and to which direction (strong or weak requirements of causality), have been put 
forward. This is probably because of important “cultural” differences in the national tort law 
systems and the way they assess causation, and the difficulties arising out of the need to 
integrate the economic concept of causality to a common legal core.  
 
The concept of causation was not even mentioned once in the White paper on Damages 
Actions, although it was acknowledged in the annexed Staff Working paper that having to 
demonstrate in detail the causation and quantification of damages remains a particular 
difficulty in competition cases, especially for anticompetitive behaviour to which several 
infringers have contributed to19. The option of lowering the standard of proof so that less 
evidence or a lesser degree of likelihood would suffice to prove causation or that of shifting 
the overall burden of proof were not, however, found appropriate solutions to mitigate these 
difficulties.  
 
The recent Damages Directive20 also does not deal explicitly with the issue of causation and 
does not include any harmonized rule as to the appropriate causation test and its operation 
in actions for damages for the infringement of EU competition law. Causation is only 
mentioned en passant in the Practical Guide on quantifying harm, as essentially a matter for 
national law, in the absence of rules at the EU level on this matter. It is also noted in this 
document that national requirements on causality or proximity that link the illegal act and the 
                                                          
15
 Commission Staff Working paper, Annex to the Green paper, Damages for breach of the EC antitrust rules, 
COM(2005) 672 final, para. 275. 
16
 See, http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/civil/docs/dcfr_outline_edition_en.pdf  
17
 See, http://www.sgecc.net/  
18
 Commission Staff Working paper, Annex to the Green paper, Damages for breach of the EC antitrust rules, 
COM(2005) 672 final, para. 276. 
19
 Commission Staff Working Paper accompanying the White paper on Damages actions for breach of the EC 
antitrust rules, COM(2008) 165 final. 
20
Directive of the European Parliament and the Council on certain rules governing actions for damages under 
national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the European 
Union (hereinafter Damages Directive), [x] OJ. 
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harm should observe the principles of equivalence and effectiveness21. However, the exact 
application of these two principles, in particular the second one, and the nature of the 
obligations they impose to Member States’ legal systems remain unclear, the only limit so far 
explicitly mentioned being that victims of anticompetitive practices enjoying standing should 
not be, as a group, denied the possibility to claim damages, because of a restrictive 
interpretation by the national court of domestic causation requirements.  
 
While standing issues have been thoroughly considered and determined as a matter of EU 
law by the Court of Justice in Courage, later in Manfredi and harmonized in Article 2 of the 
Damages Directive22, causation remains subject to the requirements of the domestic legal 
systems of the EU Member States. The subtle differences in the exact meaning of the 
concept of causation in various legal traditions and the reluctance of the Court of Justice of 
the EU to proceed to a definition of the contours of the concept in actions for damages for 
infringements of EU competition law in view of the possible repercussions to the general 
system of tort law in each jurisdiction, may have played a role in this decision initially to defer 
to national courts for the interpretation and implementation of this concept.  
 
From a theoretical viewpoint, questions of standing, the related issue of passing on and 
causation are intrinsically linked23. A broad definition of the categories of victims that will be 
allowed to sue for antitrust damages (standing) as including anyone harmed24, thus at the 
same time enabling the consideration of passing on (for indirect purchasers), will inevitably 
raise issues of causation and proximity of the harm to the illegal act. This is particularly so, in 
view of the fact that the principal objective pursued by the claim for antitrust damages for 
infringement of EU competition law is corrective justice and compensation, and not just 
deterrence. This, inevitably influences the legal concept of causation adopted in this context, 
as it also does for issues of standing, antitrust injury and recoverable damages25. The 
requirement of causation in order to claim antitrust damages for infringements of EU 
competition law plays a similar role to the requirements of standing and antitrust injury in US 
antitrust law in limiting possible claims for damages, possibly leading to under-compensation 
                                                          
21
 Commission Staff Working Document – Practical Guide Quantifying Harm in Actions for Damages Based on 
Breaches of Article 101 or 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, C(2013) 3440. 
22
 Providing for the right of “anyone who has suffered harm caused by an infringement of Union or national 
competition law” to claim “full compensation” for that harm. 
23
 Centre for European Policy Studies, Final Report, Making antitrust damages actions more effective in the EU: 
welfare impact and potential scenarios, December 21, 2007, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/files_white_paper/impact_study.pdf#page=441 , pp. 
36, 145, 415-416. 
24
 Including direct and indirect purchasers, potential consumers who would have liked to purchase the given 
goods, but refrained to do so because the price was set at a supracompetitive level and who ended up either not 
buying anything or a lower-quality good, competitors foreclosed from the relevant market as a result of the 
anticompetitive agreement, future consumers harmed by the exclusion of competitors whose presence could lead 
to future potential output increase, product differentiation, lower prices, new products and higher quality, 
umbrella customers, etc. 
25
 Centre for European Policy Studies, Final Report, Making antitrust damages actions more effective in the EU: 
welfare impact and potential scenarios, December 21, 2007, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/files_white_paper/impact_study.pdf#page=441 , pp. 
415-416 (noting that if one takes a corrective justice perspective, “a broader set of losses would be included in 
the awardable damages, and standing would be granted to a larger set of victims”). 
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(in the EU context) or under-deterrence (in the US context), should these concepts be 
interpreted restrictively26. 
 
Because of a restrictive interpretation of the requirements of causation in some Member 
States “some categories of harmed individuals or firms may not be able to prove the harm 
suffered or the causation link”, with the result that the social harm or the full amount of the 
harm inflicted will be higher than the private harm compensated through antitrust damages 
actions27. As it is shown by an empirical analysis of the actions for damages for competition 
law infringement from 1999 to 2013 in the five most important jurisdictions, in terms of the 
number of cases, in the EU, the overwhelming majority of the damages actions is brought by 
direct purchasers or excluded competitors, a category of litigants for which establishing a 
direct causal link between the anticompetitive conduct and the harm suffered does not 
present insurmountable difficulties28. 
 
As we will explain further below, certain categories of consumers, such as indirect 
purchasers, umbrella customers and counterfactual (potential) customers, may find it difficult 
to establish a direct causal link between the anticompetitive conduct and the damage they 
suffer, in view of the restrictive approach followed in certain European tort law systems on 
the causal link required by domestic tort law. Identifying the causation nexus in order to trace 
the overcharge may also prove impossible in some cases in which the anticompetitive 
practice affected various successive market levels, sometimes not vertically linked to the 
infringer. The twin concepts of causation and damage apportionment, in practice, have the 
potential to play the filtering or limiting function that other procedural and substantive rules 
have played in the development of private actions for damages in US antitrust law, although 
causation also plays its part as well in the US, in particular in view of the important 
implications of the finding of liability for antitrust harm, in particular treble damages. The next 
section briefly introduces the nature of the inquiry of the existence of a causal link in a legal 
setting. 
 
                                                          
26
 This is particularly so for tort law regimes that depart from a general rule on liability leaving it to the courts to 
set the limits of its application (e.g. France) and do not impose extra requirements, such as the duty of care in 
English tort law or the requirements of unlawfulness (Rechtswidrigket), intention or negligence (Verschulden) 
and Tatbestand in German tort law: Cees van Dam, European Tort Law (Oxford University Press, 2013), §605-
2. 
27
 Centre for European Policy Studies, Final Report, Making antitrust damages actions more effective in the EU: 
welfare impact and potential scenarios, December 21, 2007, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/files_white_paper/impact_study.pdf#page=441 , p. 
418. 
28
 I have examined the case law on damages claims for the infringement of EU and national competition in the 
five most significant (in terms of the size of the economy) jurisdictions in Europe (Germany, France, UK, Italy, 
Spain) from January 1999 to December 2013. The only jurisdictions in which damages claims were introduced 
by indirect purchasers were the United Kingdom (representing a little more than 9.3% of the total number cases) 
and Germany (2% of the total number of cases). I have not been able to identify any cases initiated by indirect 
purchasers in France, Italy and Spain. Neither was I able to identify any cases brought in any of the examined 
jurisdictions by umbrella customers or counterfactual customers. For a description and analysis of the results, 
see Table 4.1. at I. Lianos, P. Davis & P. Nebbia, Damages Claims for the Infringement of Competition Law 
(forthcoming 2015, Oxford University Press). 
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B. Distinguishing the factual from the normative element: the interplay of causation in 
fact and causation in law (or scope of liability) 
In law, causation refers to causal connections between events29. The principal function of 
causation in law is to explain the occurrence of particular events, to control events and to 
attribute moral responsibility to agents whose action has provoked the events. The idea is 
that among the variety of relationships between events (e.g. agency and harm), only some 
will be considered to constitute a legally causal relationship. Which relationships are 
selected as causal, will depend on the aims of establishing legal causation.  
 
Legal causation may serve two main purposes: (i) it is backward looking/explanatory; and (ii) 
it is attributive (e.g. establishing the responsibility of agents for the outcomes that follow their 
actions)30. When the concept of causation is used for the first, explanatory, purposes, it is 
usually referred to as causation in fact31; when it is employed for the second, attributive, 
purpose, it is usually referred to as causation in law. These two functions are not always 
pursued when one employs the concept of causation in science. For example, statistical 
causality adopts an empirical view of causation focusing on regulatory or constant 
conjunction as a necessary condition for causation. In general, this would not be considered 
as sufficient to establish legal causation, as causality employed in science usually relies on a 
causal generalization (that events of a type similar to event A almost always or regularly 
occur jointly or simultaneously with events of a type similar to event B, without it being 
possible to substantiate this finding for all the events of types A and B as there might be 
some instances in which this conjunction cannot be observed). The legal concept of 
causation would require instead a concrete instantiation of a causal law on the particular 
occasion, regarding the existence of a causal link between the specific event A and the 
specific event B32.  
 
This cautious approach followed by causation jurisprudence may be explained by its function 
to attribute responsibility to agents, and the legal consequences for the individual’s 
autonomy that may follow from a finding of liability. The use of the concept of causation in 
science (e.g. economics) does not lead to similar normative consequences, the search for a 
causal link being not confined to a specific decisional context, thus enabling its constant 
revision, according to more recent findings. Furthermore, one of the functions of causation in 
science may be to assist the scientist in making predictions over the probable consequences 
of an event or a category of events, in particular specifying “what will happen and by what 
stages if certain conditions are present together”33. This predictive and “forward-looking” 
function of causation is generally absent from tort law, the latter focusing only on examining 
                                                          
29
 In that sense, it can be distinguished from a logical connection (as cause and effect are independent of one 
another, which is not the case for logical connections) and from statistical causal connections, as for legal 
causation the determination of the causal relation is unique (connection between events). Part of the following 
developments draw from Jan Hellner, Causality and Causation in Law, (2000) 40 Scandinavian Studies in Law 
111-134. 
30
 Antony Honoré, Causation in the Law, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2010 Edition), 
Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2010/entries/causation-law/>. 
31
 X is a factual cause of Y if (i) Y actually occurred, and (ii) X is a necessary condition for Y. 
32
 Richard W. Wright, Proving Causation: Probability versus Belief, in R. Goldberg (Eds.) Perspectives on 
Causation (Hart Pub. 2011) 195-220. 
33
 Antony. Honoré, Causation in the Law, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2010 Edition), 
Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2010/entries/causation-law/>. 
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“which earlier conditions best account for some later event or state of affairs”34. 
Counterfactual reasoning in tort law should therefore be clearly distinguished from prediction 
involving speculation, as they relate only to past events and possible worlds that are on a 
par with actual worlds.  
 
This Section introduces the different concepts of causation in fact that have emerged in tort 
law scholarship, in view of the various approaches adopted in the tort law of EU member 
States, before examining the elusive character of the distinction between causation in fact 
and causation in law (responsibility) and the need to take into account the values 
represented and the objectives followed by the choice of the instrument of tort law as a 
method of regulation in a particular setting, such as the enforcement of competition law.  
 
1. Causation in fact 
A frequently used taxonomy of causation in fact distinguishes between individualizing and 
generalizing theories of causation, the former insisting “that there is a quality of being a 
cause or being causally efficacious which inheres in or belongs to particular acts or events 
and perhaps also omissions”, while the latter rely on the view that “every particular statement 
is implicitly general in the sense that its truth is dependent on the truth of some general 
statement of regularities”, thus deriving the causal quality of a particular action or event from 
“the fact that it is an instance of a kind of event believed to be regularly or generally 
connected with an event of some other kind”35.  
 
a. Individualizing theories: equivalence of conditions and NESS 
According to the theory of equivalence of conditions, any necessary condition for the 
occurrence of the damage may be considered as having caused the damage. The theory 
derives from Mill’s statement that “all the conditions” are “equally indispensable to the 
production of the consequent”, the statement of the cause being “incomplete, unless in some 
shape or other we introduce them all”36. In view of the attributive function of causation in the 
law, which is not predominant in the context of philosophical inquiry (emphasizing 
explanation), legal scholars have attempted to extract from the “necessary” conditions that 
which has caused the damage. However, each necessary condition is logically equivalent to 
the other necessary conditions, thus leading to the impossibility of establishing, at this level 
of the causal inquiry, a graduation between the necessary conditions for the occurrence of 
the damage. In view of the fact that all conditions, but one, cannot produced the damage 
and that all necessary conditions are equivalent, each of the necessary conditions 
constitutes the cause of the damage. Hence, as long as a specific conduct has set one of 
the necessary conditions for the occurrence of the damage, it forms part of the causal chain, 
even if other facts may also have contributed to the occurrence of the damage. The 
equivalence of conditions theory requires the identification through a but for test relying on a 
thought experiment formulating a counterfactual scenario of potentially necessary conditions, 
                                                          
34
 Antony Honoré, "Causation in the Law", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2010 Edition), 
Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2010/entries/causation-law/>. 
35
 Herbert L.A. Hart & Tony Honoré, Causation in the Law(OUP, 2
nd
 ed. 1985), 433 (emphasis added). 
36
 John Stuart Mill, A system of logic ratiocinative and inductive, being a connected view of the principles of 
evidence and the methods of scientific investigation (Longmans, Green & Co, 1900), 315. 
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in order to identify the conditions sine quibus non of the damage, that is, the necessary 
conditions, absent which, the specific damage would not have occurred.  
 
The “but for test” entails a strong necessity requirement, expressed in the familiar 
counterfactual inquiry. According to this test, “a condition is a cause of some result if and 
only if, but for the occurrence of the condition, the result would not have occurred, 
considering the circumstances that existed on the particular occasion”37. Hence, when 
applying the but for test, “the condition being tested, Q, is hypothetically eliminated and the 
world is run forward from that point, leaving all the other actual conditions the same insofar 
as possible, to see if the result, R, still would have occurred”38. The test thus enables the 
equal inclusion as a cause in fact of conditions that just contributed to the result as well as of 
conditions that were a substantial factor in the occurrence of the result.  
 
The test may lead to a finding of no causation (underinclusiveness issue) even though it is 
clear that the conduct in question contributed to the injury (the so called “overdetermined 
causation” problem).  For instance, in cases of causal redundancy, when a cause is 
redundant with regard to an effect, as the effect would have occurred even if the cause had 
not (pre-emptive causation), or when two conditions are simultaneous or successive and the 
actual condition would have caused the same damage as the initial one (duplicative cause), 
the test may not assist the decision-maker in identifying the relevant cause, and hence the 
actor that should be held responsible39. In this instance, if the courts are to choose “the” 
relevant cause, they will have to do this either on the basis of another factual causality test 
than the “but for” test or in the context of the relevant causation in law requirements.  
 
To provide a competition law related example, suppose that the decision-maker considers 
whether the behaviour of an individual member of a cartel has caused damage to customers. 
In some instances, at least, it may be argued that the price in the industry would have 
remained far above the competitive level even if one individual firm had not participated in 
the cartel. Suppose for the purpose of illustration that a particular firm’s decision to join the 
cartel had not affected the cartel price. A strict application of the “but-for” criterion for that 
individual firm might lead one to the conclusion that the firm’s actions caused no damage, as 
the cartel price would have stayed the same, even if this firm would not have contributed to 
the cartel.  However, in at least some cases cartels have been alleged to consist of a large 
number of small firms40. If one considered whether any individual firm’s behaviour caused 
the damage to customers, one might arrive to the conclusion that no firm should be held 
responsible.  
 
In order to avoid this problem, various correctives to the test have been proposed, the NESS 
(Necessary Element of a Sufficient Set of conditions) test being one of them. The NESS test 
                                                          
37
 Richard W. Wright, Causation, Responsibility, Risk, probability, Naked Statistics, and proof: Pruning the 
Bramble Bush by Clarifying the Concepts, (1988) 73 Iowa Law Review, 1001-1077,  1021. 
38
 Richard W. Wright, Causation, Responsibility, Risk, probability, Naked Statistics, and proof: Pruning the 
Bramble Bush by Clarifying the Concepts, (1988) 73 Iowa Law Review, 1001-1077, at 1021. 
39
 Alex Broadbent, Fact and Law in the Causal Inquiry, (2009) 15(3) Legal Theory, 173-191; Richard W. 
Wright, Causation in Tort law, (1985) 73(6) California Law Review, 1737-1828. 
40
 For example, Milk Marketing Boards and other farming collective selling organizations can have large 
numbers of farmers as members.  
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enables the inclusion of conditions that contributed to the result or were a factor in the 
occurrence of the result, thus dealing with the under-inclusiveness of the “but-for” test. This 
is achieved with the introduction in the analysis of the concept of a sufficient set of conditions 
necessary for the occurrence of an event (the damage), which does not require the 
establishment of a direct link between a specific condition and a consequent result, as this is 
the case with the necessity requirement in the “but-for” test. Hence, although each of the 
individual components of the set would not be sufficient for producing the specific damage, if 
it forms part of set of conditions that would be sufficient for the occurrence of the damage, it 
would be deemed to have a causal character. By introducing the concept of the set of 
sufficient conditions, the NESS test dissociates necessity from sufficiency. The existence of 
an alternative necessary condition, part of the specific set of sufficient conditions, does not 
deny the finding of causation, as all necessary elements of that sufficient set of conditions 
would be deemed to constitute the cause. 
 
Suppose that any two of three colluding firms could have colluded and the result would have 
been a high price level.  A strict application of the ‘but-for’ or ‘strong necessity test’ might 
conclude that the behaviour of any one firm, say firm 1, was not necessary for the result that 
a cartel led to high prices and so causation is not established. But for the actions of firm 1, 
firms 2 and 3 would have colluded anyway and this would have led to cartel prices. Of 
course the same could be said for any individual participant in the cartel. NESS on the other 
hand considers a firm’s behaviour to be a cause if it is a necessary element of (or condition 
contributing to) some set of antecedent actual conditions that was sufficient for the 
occurrence of the cartel. Here there is a set of antecedent conditions, that involving the 
behaviour of firms 1 and 2 coordinating prices, where firm 1’s behaviour is a necessary 
element of the conditions sufficient to cause customers to pay cartel prices. 
 
Yet, this test may also lead to a problem of over-inclusiveness in the presence of multiple 
simultaneous sufficient causes that may constitute competing alternatives, rather than 
cumulative ones, for the occurrence of the damage. Assume that an excluded or 
marginalised undertaking suffered losses of market share and thus profits, because of the 
conduct/strategy of a dominant undertaking in a relevant market. Some of this conduct was 
found to constitute an exclusionary abuse under Article 102 TFEU, while some other parts of 
this strategy were found compatible with Article 102 TFEU, because of the superior 
efficiency of the undertaking41. It will be important in this case to distinguish the harm that 
was caused by the conduct found illegal, and the losses caused by the conduct that was 
found legal. For instance the loss of market share may not constitute, as such, harm caused 
by the illegal conduct, but may be the result of legal conduct. This is impractical, at least at 
the step of establishing causation (if this is viewed independently from that of the 
quantification of harm). The application of the NESS test may hence lead to over-
inclusiveness as the loss will be imputed entirely to the conduct found illegal, both causes 
being simultaneously sufficient for the occurrence of the damage. A way out, for the NESS 
test, would be to consider that the victim has suffered no loss if their lost market share would 
                                                          
41
 For instance, one part of the conduct might be non-price related and the other one price-related for which the 
European Commission and most recently the courts apply an as efficient as competitor test. Hence, while the 
exclusion of a less efficient competitor might constitute a competition law infringement if it is non-price related, 
it will not if it is price-related. 
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have occurred in any event, as a result of the conduct found legal, the illegal conduct being 
not causative of a loss42. 
 
b. Generalizing or generalist theories of causation: the theory of adequate cause 
Moore explains that generalist theories of causation “seek to reduce that relation between 
state of affairs tokens, to some law-based relation between state of affairs types”43. The 
theory of adequate cause constitutes the archetype of a generalizing theory of causation in 
fact, as it focuses on the condition or conditions that would objectively be of the nature to 
produce the type of damage examined, not necessarily the specific damage or event. The 
theory of adequate cause presents close characteristics to scientific theories of causation, in 
the sense that it puts emphasis on the regularity of the occurrence of types of events in order 
to infer from this a causal generalization implemented in the specific case examined. This 
involves the description of a class of events whose probability must be shown to have 
significantly increased by the condition/conduct in question. The condition may be described 
either in the light of what the actor knew at the time of the act, or in light of the knowledge of 
a “prudent man”, or, finally, by reference to “what was or has become known otherwise, for 
example, circumstances existing at the time of the […] act which have been discovered 
through the subsequent course of events”44.  
 
The “scope of the rule” doctrine often complements the analysis of probabilities, providing 
some limits to the extent to which conditions are considered as the adequate cause. This is 
an element of causation in law, although it also plays an important role in determining 
adequate cause in the context of causation in fact. Courts may refer to the purpose of the 
rule violated (“Normzweck”), determined according to its scope (“Schutzbereich”), in order to 
focus their inquiry only on those conditions that relate directly to the purpose of the rule 
breached45. This provides judges with some discretion over the interpretation of the scope of 
the rule and consequently the conditions to take into account. It also enables them to focus 
the analysis only on the risks that the legal system expects the actors not to bear for 
themselves. Depending on how important the analysis of the “scope of the rule” doctrine is in 
the process of determining causation in fact, one may conclude that the causation in fact 
inquiry may be disposed of in certain circumstances. 
 
2. Criticisms to a strict distinction between cause in fact and legal causation (or 
responsibility) 
As it transpires from the above discussion, it is difficult to separate issues of fact from issues 
of legal policy in the determination of causation in fact. The operation of the principle of 
equivalence of conditions or sine qua non condition, frequently used to determine causation 
in fact, does not conclude the causation in fact inquiry. In addition, it becomes important to 
examine the presence of the causal connection required by the relevant legal rule. This is an 
issue that is partly influenced by factors derived from common sense notions of causation 
(thus, a factual matter), and partly by “scope rules”, that is, the question of whether, as a 
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 I am indebted to Sandy Steel for this remark. 
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 Michael S. Moore, Causation and Reponsibility: An Essay in Law, Morals and Metaphysics (Oxford 
University Press, 2009), 471. 
44
 Herbert L.A. Hart & Tony Honoré, Causation in the Law (OUP, 2
nd
 ed. 1985), 482, referring to Max Rümelin, 
Der Zufall im Recht (J.C.B. Möhr, 1896). 
45
 See the discussion in Herbert L.A. Hart & Tony Honoré, Causation in the Law (OUP, 2
nd
 ed. 1985), 472-478. 
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matter of policy, the law ought in this case to enlarge or restrict liability46. Hence, one should 
distinguish between causal limitations that are common in all areas of law and limitations 
resulting out of “scope rules”, which may vary in each area of law according to the policy 
issues that are considered relevant47.  
 
It follows from the above that there are three steps to be distinguished in the causal inquiry: 
the first step will attempt to identify factual causation, for instance the conditions but for 
which the damage will not have occurred (conditions sine qua non). The second step will 
attempt to identify further causal connections not identified by the sine qua non test, based 
on “common sense principles”, common to all areas of law. For instance, the intervention of 
a deliberate voluntary human act or abnormal coincidence will “break the chain of the causal 
connection”, even if the subsequent events would not have occurred but for the examined 
conduct. The third step will engage with policy reasons and will include scope limitations 
“truncating liability more narrowly” than that produced by mere satisfaction of a designated 
causal requirement48.  
 
Although issues relating to cause in fact (the explanatory function of causation) and issues 
relating to legal responsibility (the attributive function of causation) are clearly separated49, 
the “practical interests” of the decision-maker and the context in which causation should be 
identified exercise some influence, to a certain extent, on the operation of the natural causal 
inquiry (causation in fact)50. If one is to distinguish causes from “mere circumstances or 
conditions”, the practical interests and the purpose of the person making the causal 
statement may influence the decision to treat as cause an event or a deliberate human 
intervention that makes a difference to the normal course of events which accounts for the 
difference in outcome51. In the absence of a universally applicable legal test of causation, the 
law may employ different tests in different circumstances, indicating that cause in fact can 
never be a purely factual issue52. Furthermore, issues of relevance are never absent from a 
cause in fact inquiry, although not as explicitly as with the cause in law inquiry. One has 
always to identify the causal facts out of the non-causal ones (mere conditions). In practice, 
the starting point of causal inquiries is often reversed: we start from what is thought to 
constitute the causally relevant events, before asking whether these amount to causes in 
fact53. Finally, causation in law depends also on common sense principles, such as the 
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 Herbert L.A. Hart & Tony Honoré, Causation in the Law (OUP, 2
nd
 ed. 1985), 304-307. 
47
 Jane Stappleton, Law, Causation and Common Sense, (1988) 8 (1) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 111-131, 
116. 
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 Jane Stappleton, Law, Causation and Common Sense, (1988) 8 (1) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 111-131, 
122. 
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 Richard W. Wright, The Nightmare and the Noble Dream: Hart and Honoré on Causation and Responsibility, 
in Matthew H. Kramer, Claire Grant, Ben Colburn, and Antony Hatzistavrou (eds.), The Legacy of H.L.A. Hart: 
Legal Political and Moral Philosophy (Oxford University Pres, 2008), pp. 165-180. 
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 Christian von Bar, Causation or Attribution, in The Common European Law of Torts: Volume Two (Oxford 
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 Richard W. Wright, The Nightmare and the Noble Dream: Hart and Honoré on Causation and Responsibility, 
in Matthew H. Kramer, Claire Grant, Ben Colburn, and Antony Hatzistavrou (eds.), The Legacy of H.L.A. Hart: 
Legal Political and Moral Philosophy (Oxford University Pres, 2008), 165-180. 
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 Alex Broadbent, Fact and Law in the Causal Inquiry, (2009) 15(3) Legal Theory, 173-191. 
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 Alex Broadbent, Fact and Law in the Causal Inquiry, (2009) 15(3) Legal Theory, 173-191. 
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ability of the agent to reasonably foresee the damage, which is also linked to the scope of 
the duty of care the agent has towards the victim, hence a mixed facts and law/policy issue.  
 
Does this mean that the causation in fact and causation in law inquiries should be merged? 
It is important here to note that the “practical interests” of the inquiry, occasionally taken into 
account in the causation in fact inquiry, remain distinct from issues of justice, efficiency and, 
more generally, policy, which enter the picture only when examining the attributive function 
of legal causation (responsibility), that is, choosing “the” responsible cause. This is not a 
purely causal inquiry but a policy inquiry dealing with issues of moral and legal 
responsibility54. An event may be a cause of the injury (actual causation/causation in fact) 
but not “the” responsible cause, if the injury would have occurred anyway as a result of non-
responsible conditions or other moral, economic, legal arguments weighing against liability55. 
The principal aim of causation in law is to limit liability, once a causal relation has been 
identified. 
 
The distinction between natural causation (causation in fact) and responsibility (causation in 
law) implies that the causal inquiry takes a factual, empirical approach and should almost 
always be kept separate from policy issues. However, while recognizing the importance of 
such distinction for conceptual clarity purposes, implementing it constitutes a more complex 
endeavour, as in reality the law retains a central role in determining causation in fact and, in 
particular, which natural causation test is to be applied, among the many put forward56. In 
addition, the form of the causal requirement becomes an issue of policy as long as cause 
may be conceived narrowly, as referring to a voluntary act of doing harm or, more broadly, 
as covering an unintentional conduct of “occasioning harm”, or, in other words, an act 
providing the opportunity or means necessary for harm to occur. Rules concerning the 
existence of presumptions or the allocation of the burden of proof may also introduce policy 
considerations in the assessment of causation in fact, eventually operating as alternatives to 
it (ersatz to factual causation)57. The analysis of the way tort law systems deal with situations 
of causal uncertainty, which are quite frequent in damages claims for competition law 
infringements, shows the strong interplay of causation in fact and causation in law 
(responsibility) in this context. 
 
III. Causal uncertainty and actions for competition law damages: a 
comparative perspective 
Causal uncertainty may take different forms. It may relate to a situation in which the conduct 
of multiple tortfeasors may have contributed to the realization of the damage, hence making 
attribution of the damage suffered to the conduct of a specific defendant particularly difficult 
(situations of preemptive and duplicative cause). For instance, according to the cumulative 
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 Richard W. Wright, Causation, Responsibility, Risk, Probability, Naked Statistics, and Proof: Pruning the 
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effect doctrine of the Court of Justice in Delimitis, a combination of tying/exclusive 
purchasing agreements might infringe Article 101 TFEU if it would be difficult for competing 
suppliers to enter the market because of the cumulative effects of the networks of 
agreements by different suppliers in the market (the foreclosure effect of all the networks of 
agreements) and the supplier network to which the agreement under consideration formed 
part had a significant contribution to the foreclosure effect (contribution of the specific 
network of agreements to the foreclosure effect)58. The collective dimension of antitrust 
liability in this context does not avoid the necessary examination at the stage of the 
attribution of the damage the causal relation between a specific conduct by one of the 
multiple tortfeasors and the damage suffered.  
 
A second form of uncertainty may relate to the lack of clear evidence on the causal link 
between the conduct of a defendant and the damage suffered by the claimant, or on the lack 
of scientific consensus on the inferences that can be drawn from the evidence. The relative 
uncertainty which may characterize a complex causal inquiry, as that usually required in the 
context of competition law enforcement, has led legal doctrine to develop auxiliary methods 
of establishing legal causation, without proceeding to an in depth analysis of factual 
causation, according to the theories mentioned above.  
 
A. Five ways to deal with situations of causal uncertainty 
Causal uncertainty constitutes a feature of tort litigation, in particular following the 
development of mass tort litigation and the increasing reliance on scientific evidence in 
damages cases59. The application of the traditional but-for or sine qua non causal test in 
these circumstances, coupled with the prevailing evidentiary rules on the standard of proof 
may lead to a perceived failure of tort law to provide compensation to victims of mass torts 
(under-compensation), where the court determines that the required standard of proof was 
not met, or to over-compensation, should the court decide, despite causal uncertainty, that 
the required standard of proof is met and that causation has been established60. In view of 
the negative effects of such an all-or-nothing approach to corrective justice and deterrence 
(at least in most circumstances), legal systems have opted for different strategies in order to 
respond to situations of causal uncertainty. The sources of causal uncertainty may be 
multiple: broadly defined, it may be evidential, when there is uncertainty over the facts, or 
scientific, when there is uncertainty over the inferences that should be drawn out of the facts 
on the basis of the scientific method (as opposed to just common sense). 
 
Legal systems may select to address causal uncertainty as an issue (i) of factual causation, 
(ii) relating to causation in law (responsibility), (iii) that requires specific procedural rules, (iv) 
that requires a public law solution, or (v) to be ignored altogether.  
 
For instance, with regard to the first approach, one may decide to attribute responsibility for 
a specific harm, according to the probability that the specific tortious activity was a factual 
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cause of it61. This may lead the legal system to accept “causal proportional liability”, which is 
defined as “the tort liability imposed on D for harm suffered by P, for part of it, or for harm 
that P may suffer, according to the causal probability that D’s tortious conduct may have 
caused the harm or caused part of it or may cause harm in the future”62. Systems of causal 
proportional liability may take different forms, one of which constitutes the well-known 
doctrine of loss of a chance chance’ (or ‘loss of opportunity’ in the jargon of the newly 
adopted Damages Directive). 
 
With regard to the second approach, which is often used in situations of multiple tortfeasors, 
the legal system may opt, causal uncertainty notwithstanding, to recognize the existence of 
the causal link and hence the liability of the multiple tortfeasors and then to provide rules that 
apportion liability among the multiple tortfeasors (contribution or recourse claims) or between 
the defendants and the claimants (contributory negligence). As it is rightly explained in a 
recent comparative study by the European Centre of Tort and Insurance Law, these rules 
differ from causal proportional liability as “they apportion harm after it has been established 
by the required burden and standard of proof that the multiple tortfeasors or [the claimant] 
were a factual cause of the same share (or all) of the [claimant’s] harm”63. For this reason, 
joint (or solidary64) and several liability of multiple tortfeasors in competition law 
infringements. 
 
The third approach maintains the traditional all or nothing approach, but shifts the burden of 
proof from the claimant to the defendant, and is accompanied by solidary liability65, the 
objective being to ease the burden of proof for the party that was the alleged victim of the 
infringement, essentially for fairness reasons66. 
 
The fourth approach recognizes that the usual mechanisms of tort law may not provide 
adequate compensation to those harmed in situations of causal uncertainty and advances 
an administrative governance solution that would substitute “public law sanctions (taxes, 
fines or fund schemes) for tort liability”, the collected money being used “to repair [the 
claimants’] harm, on a collective or individual basis, and to help prevent such harms in the 
future67. A functional equivalent consists in bypassing “the causal relation problem” and 
                                                          
61
 I. Gilead, M.D. Green & B.A. Koch, General Report – Causal Uncertainty and Proportional Liability: 
Analytical and Comparative Report, in I. Gilead, M.D. Green & B.A. Koch  (eds.), Proportional Liability: 
Analytical and Comparative Perspectives (De Gruyter, 2013), 1-73, 2. 
62
 
62
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allowing “class or representative claims in which the claimants are not required to establish 
the individual harm caused by each [defendant] to each claimant but rather the overall harm 
caused to the [claimants] as a group”, the awarded amount being distributed among the 
claimants68. For instance, this will involve class actions or representative actions, or even a 
public compensation scheme to compensate those injured by the public enforcement 
activities of the competition authority. 
 
Ignoring the problem will lead to over-compensation or under-compensation, depending on 
the domestic evidence rules on the standard of proof. The interaction of the standard of 
proof and the strategy adopted by each legal system should not be under-estimated and 
constitutes in most cases the main reason justifying the choice made69. 
 
We will focus here on the different expressions of causal proportional liability, such as the 
doctrine of the loss of chance, market share liability, and liability according to the contribution 
of the tortious conduct to the risk. 
 
The primary purpose of the doctrine of the loss of chance, as is the case for other forms of 
causal proportional liability, is to strengthen the victim’s position in situations of causal 
uncertainty, in which it is difficult for the claimant to prove the existence of a causal link 
between the claimant’s conduct and the damage. 
 
In some civil legal systems70, in particular in France, the doctrine of loss of chance 
constitutes a specific and autonomous type of damage71, with reference to the final damage, 
in view of the open and general nature of tortious liability72. The concept is employed when 
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the occurrence of the damage is certain, and had a particular condition or hypothetical 
outcome be realized. One may distinguish this “second degree” or “relative” certainty as to 
the loss of a chance, from the situation of hypothetical damage, which it is not clear will be 
compensated under French law, in view of the requirement of certainty and the high 
standard of proof the claimant needs to overcome. It is however necessary that the lost 
chance is “deemed as real and serious”73. This requires the claimant to establish “the mere 
probability of materialization of the result that the chance offered”74. The compensation of the 
victim may also be partial, which contrasts with the all-or-nothing approach of the usual 
causation in fact requirement with regard to the award of the damage. This may potentially 
dispose of the requirement of causal link altogether as the plaintiff may be granted partial 
compensation equivalent to the fraction of the value or the advantage denied as a result of 
the loss of chance. The compensation is awarded by calculating the advantage expected by 
the victim, if the condition or hypothetical outcome had been realized, had the probability that 
this hypothetical outcome be realized75. The concept thus offers the judge the opportunity to 
engage in the assessment of probabilities for the chance or opportunity to be realized, based 
on factors or causal presumptions that are not linked to the specific individual causal link 
between the harmful conduct and the damage. Compensation is thus not related to evidence 
of an individual causal link between the harm and the conduct, but requires partial 
compensation of all parties affected by the loss of the opportunity/chance, once the harmful 
conduct has been identified, on the basis of how likely/probable the realization of this 
opportunity/chance was)76. 
 
One may also refer to “market share liability” as another situation of causal uncertainty dealt 
with by causal proportional liability. In US law, the judge may award compensation by 
reference to the market shares of the entities that have engaged in the harmful conduct, thus 
linking the market share of each entity to the risk the harmful conduct caused to the affected 
party and consequently to the amount of the damage to be awarded77.  
 
Alternatively, causal proportional liability maybe based “on the ex ante risk created by [a 
defendant], rather than an ex post assessment of the probability of having caused a specific 
claimant’s harm”78. Consequently, a duty of reparation may be imposed to those responsible 
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for the loss of chance, in accordance with the risk their conduct/activities created to the loss 
of that opportunity.  
 
Causal presumptions or evidential short-cuts constitute an alternative tool to dispose of 
difficult factual causation issues. The reversal of the burden of proof may also constitute an 
additional ersatz of causation in fact. Inevitably, principles of public policy exercise significant 
influence in the design of these causal presumptions, which may lead to inferences of a 
causal link or a reversal of the burden of proof to the defendant, relieving the claimants of 
any real obligation to show a factual causal connection between a conduct and a harm or 
loss suffered. In particular, causal presumptions avoid the hurdle of establishing a direct 
causal link between the conduct of the defendant and a hypothetical but probable loss. 
Causal presumptions may ultimately force the defendant to act as an insurer providing 
compensation to all members of a class of claimants that has suffered losses, even in the 
presence of only a tenuous relationship with its conduct. The limited institutional competence 
of judges argues against such presumptions being established by the judiciary, although a 
significant experience with a certain type of cases and evidence may lead the judiciary, in 
specific circumstances, to develop inferences of causation. The legislator may nevertheless 
take the initiative to establish causal presumptions in order to facilitate proof for certain 
categories of claimants. Inevitably, policy considerations and distributive justice concerns, in 
particular, may explain the choice for such an approach.  
 
B. Towards the development of EU causation rules for competition law based actions 
for damages? 
The Ashurst study on the conditions of claims for damages acknowledged that “the test of 
causation is approached in very different ways in the Member States”79. Indeed, a cursory 
view of the different general tort law regimes of the most significant, in terms of the number 
of damages actions, EU Member States show important differences as to the choice of 
causation in fact tests and the interaction between causation in fact and the scope of liability 
rules (causation in law) (1). More importantly, the implementation so far of causation 
principles in damages actions for the infringement of competition law in various EU Member 
States illustrates that strict causation requirements, or more accurately the perception that 
causation requirements constitute an important hurdle, may limit the opportunities of certain 
categories of claimants to bring forward their claims, thus undermining the effectiveness of 
the EU remedy of damages for competition law infringements (2). This has led to some effort 
at the EU level to facilitate the position of certain categories of claimants (3). 
 
1. A comparative analysis of causation rules in the European Union: England and 
Wales, Germany and France 
A comparative analysis of causation rules in the various tort law legal systems of the EU 
Member states illustrates the great variety of approaches followed, first with regard to the 
distinction and the subsequently the interaction between causation in fact and the scope of 
liability (or causation in law) and, second, with regard to the approach followed with regard to 
situations of causal uncertainty. 
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a. England and Wales 
English (and Welsh) law divides the assessment of causation into two steps: first 
determining causation in fact and, second, determining causation in law or legal cause80.  
 
With regard to causation in law, English law proceeds with a number of specific enactments 
that impose a duty of care, if that was the legislative intention, or more generally under the 
general tort of negligence. The court determines whether, in the particular circumstances of 
the case, the defendant owed a duty of care to the claimant, in view of the scope of 
protection afforded by the statutory duty breached. A duty of care is generally found to exist 
if the economic injury to the claimant was foreseeable, there is a relation of proximity 
between the claimant and the defendant and it would be “fair, just and reasonable to impose 
a duty of care upon the defendant”81. The concept of causation in law aims to distinguish 
those causes to which the law assigns responsibility. Under common law, cause in law is 
found when the event is not too ‘remote’ from the defendant’s wrongful conduct (e.g. a free, 
deliberate, informed action normally breaks the chain of causation between the defendant’s 
conduct and the victim’s injury). Remoteness involves the likelihood of the harm (hence a 
test implicitly based on probabilities, excluding from compensation an improbable loss, that 
is, damage that a reasonable person could not have foreseen), its gravity, or broader policy 
questions, such as fairness, the insurability of the harm, or ensuring efficient loss shifting or 
spreading through the implementation of the least cost avoidance principle or the 
development of standards reflecting social values and concerns with regard to the allocation 
of risks and responsibilities. Policy or normative considerations may also be taken into 
account in the course of establishing if there is a duty of care. For instance, with regard to 
the tort of breach of statutory duty, English courts examine whether the harm suffered by the 
claimant relates to the statutory duty breached82. However, this does not go as far as 
incorporating in English law the “scope of the rule” doctrine that would have required an 
elaborate inquiry on the boundaries of the scope of protection and the interests safeguarded 
by the specific statutory duty breached.  
 
With regard to causation in fact, the English courts employ the “but for test”83. The claimant 
must show that it is more likely than not that the damage would not have occurred “but for” 
the defendant’s breach of duty. As it is put by Clerk and Lindsell on Torts, referred to by the 
Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT) in 2 Travel Group:  
“(t)he first step in establishing causation is to eliminate irrelevant causes, and this is the 
purpose of the “but for” test. The courts are concerned, not to identify all of the possible 
causes of a particular incident, but with the effective cause of the resulting damage in 
order to assign responsibility for that damage. The “but for” test asks: would the damage 
of which the claimant complains have occurred “but for” the negligence (or other 
wrongdoing) of the defendant? Or to put it more accurately, can the claimant adduce 
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evidence to show that it is more likely than not, more than 50 per cent probable, that “but 
for” the defendant’s wrongdoing the relevant damage would not have occurred. In other 
words, if the damage would have occurred in any event the defendant’s conduct is not a 
“but for” cause.”84 
 
However, the “but-for” test was modified, or some would argue ignored, in certain cases of 
causal uncertainty, either because the claimant’s injury was provoked by the conduct of 
multiple indeterminate defendants, or because of a genuine scientific uncertainty as to the 
inferences that may be drawn from the factual record. English law has provided a choice of a 
variety of instruments from those listed above with regard to situations of causal uncertainty. 
 
In situations of “indeterminate cause”, when the individual responsible for the harm cannot 
be identified, the courts have opted for an ersatz of causation in fact, the reversal of the 
burden of proof, so that each of the defendants has to show that his conduct did not produce 
the harm85. In the absence of such proof, both tortfeasors may be held liable. This solution, 
however, “only works in English law if the probabilities are equally split between two 
defendants”, but does not do so “if there are more than two defendants, and the probability 
that each has caused the harm is less than even”86. In these cases, maintaining the but-for-
test, coupled with a reversal of the burden of proof, would not be sufficient to establish 
causation. 
 
The but-for test was also found inoperable in situations where the application of the test 
would have led to the conclusion that each of the defendants’ conduct could have caused 
the harm, each of the defendants being equally to blame for the claimant’s loss. English 
courts have found multiple tortfeasors to be liable in solidum (jointly and severally liable), 
each of them being potentially responsible for the full amount of the loss, even if such 
solution cannot be reconciled with a strict application of the but-for test, thus choosing to 
address the issue of proportional liability when deciding the apportionment/contribution of the 
harm or the extent of contributory negligence (hence at the redress stage), rather than at the 
level of causation in fact (which is presumed to have been established)87. 
 
Situations of genuine scientific uncertainty were dealt by the introduction of an exception to 
the application of but-for test in Fairchild88, an exception “to the ordinary application of 
principles of causation”, and narrowly confined to “situations of scientific, as opposed to 
merely evidential, uncertainty, as to the cause of the condition, and the fact that the condition 
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resulted from the same (or at least similar risks) to which the claimant was exposed”89. This 
mesothelioma-related diseases tort case law has accepted the development of “weaker” or 
broader causal link tests, for cases presenting an important evidential uncertainty, for 
instance because of uncertainty in the available scientific evidence on the existence of a 
causal link when multiple causal factors are at play. Causation in fact was therefore found 
where the defendant in breach of the statutory duty materially increased the risk of the 
claimant suffering a particular kind of loss90 or simply because the defendant increased the 
probability of harm which that statutory duty aimed to avoid91. Hence, it is possible to 
establish causation in fact, by virtue of a material increase in risk in the presence of an 
evidential impossibility to prove the causal link on the balance of probabilities92.  
 
The finding of such liability leads to the question of the extent of the liability of the 
defendants (and/or the contributory negligence of the claimant), the choice being between a 
rule that would have found them joint and severally liable for the full amount of the damage 
(thus choosing to address the issue at the stage of the apportionment of damages to the 
harm/redress stage, the claimant being able to seek compensation in full from any the 
solidary tortfeasors) and a rule that would have found them liable for only a proportionate 
share reflecting their contribution to the total risk (hence the claimant should seek 
compensation from each party in relation to the harm that party caused)93. Although these 
two doctrines are considered in some contexts interchangeable as methods to resolve 
causal uncertainty, as we have explained above, they constitute two genuinely different 
approaches to situations of scientific uncertainty and impose different burdens on the 
claimant and defendants. The English courts finally chose the route of the proportionate 
liability94. They also prefer to risk unfairness to the claimants by reversing the burden of 
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proof to the defendant, if the claimant can show a material increase in risk, rather than taking 
the view that the increase of the risk constitutes the damage itself, which may have changed 
the substantive law’s notion of damage, simply because of an evidentiary difficulty95. For all 
these cases where there is “inherent uncertainty” as to the proof that the defendant’s 
wrongful conduct caused the claimant’s loss, because of the above evidentiary difficulties, 
but where it is possible to estimate the chance that the defendant caused the loss, damages 
are calculated by multiplying the magnitude of the chance lost, which can be estimated, by 
the total loss suffered. As Steel explains, the doctrine “is better thought as creating 
proportionate liability in proportion to the chance that the defendant has caused” the harm: 
“(d)amages are for the chance of causation, not causation of a lost chance”96. Although the 
doctrine of loss of a chance is not properly adopted in English law with regard to cases of 
personal injury, loss of a chance awards have been accepted in the context of compensation 
actions for pure economic loss97. As to the “market share liability” option, this has not yet 
been accepted by English courts98. With regard to causal uncertainty as to future harm, 
English law distinguishes between “cases in which it is uncertain whether the [claimant] will 
suffer any harm at all and cases in which harm has already been caused but the scope of 
the harm (or the development of a new harm) in the future is unknown”99. While the first 
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category does not give rise to causation and thus damages are not awarded, the second is a 
matter usually addressed at the stage of the quantification of damages100. 
 
Moving to concrete competition law examples, in Albion Water, the UK Competition Appeal 
Tribunal (hereinafter, CAT) examined a follow on claim for damages brought by a water 
company, Albion Water, against the defendant utility company, Dŵr Cymru, relying on the 
finding of the CAT that the defendant had engaged to an abuse of a dominant position by 
adopting the practices of margin squeeze and charging excessive prices101. The CAT 
examined the issues of causation and quantum. Albion was asserting that if it had been 
offered a reasonable price for common carriage by Dŵr Cymru it would have accepted that 
offer and thus would have been able to make more money on its supply of water to some of 
its existing customers and could have also bid to supply others. The CAT thus proceeded by 
comparing the money that Albion would have made in the counterfactual world (but for the 
infringement) with the money it in fact made from the supply to existing customers in order to 
see if it has suffered any loss.  
 
The CAT constructed the counterfactual cautiously by assuming that the defendant would 
not have engaged in illegal conduct and would have negotiated a reasonable agreement, in 
view of the possibility of the regulator, OFWAT, to intervene and apply concurrently 
competition law as well as the Water Industry Act. Although the CAT recognized that there is 
a range of lawful access prices that Dŵr Cymru could have offered, the CAT took the middle 
of that range, on the assumption that the defendant would have offered a reasonable access 
price rather than the highest price it would lawfully have charged102. It also held that on 
balance of probabilities Albion would have agreed to this rate. When examining the other 
costs of supply of Albion in the counterfactual world the CAT took care to evaluate the 
commercial reality of the parties’ relative positions and their bargaining power, as well as 
overall industry practice. 
 
The case presents a particular interest in view of the analysis by the CAT of the loss of the 
opportunity that Albion would have had in the counterfactual world to bid for a contract to 
supply water to a new customer, which had invited Albion to tender. Albion was alleging that 
the defendant’s abusive behavior effectively deprived it of that opportunity, as Albion was 
obliged to focus its very limited resources on the competition case and simply did not have 
the resources to devote to pursuing other business opportunities103. The CAT analyzed this 
as a loss of chance claim. The CAT referred to the Allied Maples Group Ltd v Simmons & 
Simmons case law of the Court of appeal in which Stuart-Smith LJ highlighting the distinction 
between causation and quantification of damages by the different function probability 
judgments played in each context: 
 “[…] What has to be proved to establish a causal link between the negligence of the 
defendants and the loss sustained by the plaintiffs depends in the first instance on 
whether the negligence consists in some positive act or misfeasance, or an omission or 
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non-feasance. In the former case, the question of causation is one of historical fact. […] 
Once established on the balance of probability, that fact is taken as true and the plaintiff 
recovers his damage in full. There is no discount because the judge considers that the 
balance is only just tipped in favour of the plaintiff; and the plaintiff gets nothing if he fails 
to establish that it is more likely than not that the accident resulted in the injury.  
Questions of quantification of the plaintiff’s loss, however, may depend upon future 
uncertain events. […] It is trite law that these questions are not decided on a balance of 
probability, but rather on the court's assessment, often expressed in percentage terms, 
of the risk eventuating or the prospect of promotion, which, it should be noted, depends 
in part at least on the hypothetical acts of a third party”104.  
 
The Court of appeal also noted that if the plaintiff’s loss depends on the hypothetical action 
of a third party, either in addition to action by the plaintiff or independently, the plaintiff may 
succeed provided that he shows on the balance of probabilities there is a substantial 
chance, rather than a speculative one. The evaluation of the substantial chance is an issue 
relating to the quantification of damages, the quantum being in this case the relevant 
percentage of the total profit that would have been made if Albion had indeed won the 
business. The assessment of the chance in the context of quantification is done in a “range 
lying somewhere between something that just qualifies as real or substantial on the one 
hand and near certainty on the other”105. 
 
The CAT found in this case that it would have been highly likely for Albion to win this 
contract, although not as high as certain or near certain and reduced consequently Albion’s 
damages for its lost opportunity by one third (33%).  
 
In Enron Coal Services Ltd & English Welsh & Scottish Railway Ltd, the Court of appeal 
(Civil Division) and the CAT examined the claim by Enron (ECSL) that it had been deprived, 
following the anticompetitive conduct of EWS, of a real or substantial chance of winning a 
contract for the supply of coal to one of Edison’s (EME’s) power stations106. EWS was found 
by the UK Office of Rail Regulation (ORR) to have infringed the Chapter II of the UK 
Competition Act 1998 prohibition by having abused of its dominant position in the market for 
coal haulage by rail, by setting higher prices to Enron for coal haulage than what it did to 
other customers, thus putting Enron at a competitive disadvantage, in particular with regard 
to coal haulage supply to two power stations owned by Edison. Enron brought a follow on 
damages claim arguing that EWS’s conduct caused it to lose a real or substantial chance of 
gaining a profitable conduct with Edison. The CAT held that to succeed in this claim Enron 
had to show on the balance of probabilities what it would have done, but for the 
infringement, thus requiring Enron to build a counterfactual (but for) world in which it would 
have submitted a bid to EME achieving similar terms than those awarded by Edison to 
Enron’s competitor, EWS, and that it would have used this opportunity in order to negotiate 
with Edison a contract to supply coal to one of its power stations. Furthermore, Enron had to 
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establish that “there was a real or substantial chance” that negotiations would have led EME 
to award the contract of coal supply to Enron. The CAT, confirmed by the Court of appeal, 
dismissed Enron’s claim taking the view that it would have failed to prove what was needed 
on either of these issues. The competitive disadvantage that Enron was suffering following 
the discriminatory conduct of EWS was not in itself a finding that it had suffered loss, 
although this fact was relevant to the question of causation. It was not however 
determinative of causation as the award of the contract by EME was not only a question of 
price, but also depended on other considerations, such as the quality and reliability of the 
proposed service. It is noteworthy that the CAT and the Court of appeal constructed the but 
for scenario on the basis of circumstantial evidence in the “real world”, for instance the 
difficult previous commercial relations between the parties, the lack of enthusiasm of Enron’s 
senior staff about winning the contract and Edison’s general unwillingness to enter into a 
long term coal supply contract, as this transpired from the evidential findings in the ORR 
decision. Hence, even if EWS’s anticompetitive conduct and the subsequent competitive 
disadvantage suffered by Enron was a factor preventing Enron from contracting successfully 
with Edison for coal supply, this contribution to Enron’s loss of a chance was not considered 
sufficient to constitute evidence of causation. The all-or-nothing approach followed by the 
application of the “but-for” test in this context led the CAT and the Court of appeal to reject 
Enron’s claim, without being possible to compensate Enron’s loss of a chance/opportunity to 
win the contract as a specific head of damage, as it is possible under French tort law107. 
 
Causation was also thoroughly examined in Cardiff Bus, a case involving a follow on claim 
for damages, relying on an OFT decision finding that a bus company, Cardiff Bus, had 
abused its dominant position by engaging in exclusionary practices (predatory conduct 
through the launching of loss-making bus services, the so called “White Services” on top of 
their regular liveried service) against a rival bus company, 2 Travel, and leading it to 
liquidation108. The damages claimed by 2 Travel were substantial and covered lost profits, 
loss of a capital asset, loss of a commercial opportunity, wasted staff and management time 
and the costs relating to Travel 2 liquidation.  
 
The defendant, Cardiff Bus, raised the issue of factual causation and advanced a strict but-
for test that would have compared the losses in the real world with those in the but-for world, 
but only to the extent that these losses would not have occurred in the but-for world 
scenario. Cardiff Bus’ argument was that in any case 2 Travel would have gone bankrupt, in 
view of its weak financial position and its mismanagement, hence the costs involved by 2 
Travel’s liquidation would also have been incurred in the “but-for” world scenario. 2 Travel 
was advancing a broader causation test, arguing that it should focus instead on the factors 
that have contributed to the damage, in this case 2 Travel’s exit from the market. Hence, if 
Cardiff Bus’ predatory conduct was a contributing factor to its exit from the market, that 
would be a sufficient finding upon which to infer causation. The nature of the behavior (its 
predatory character) and the intent of Cardiff Bus to cause the “type” of damage actually 
incurred, would be sufficient elements, according to 2 Travel, for the finding of causation. 
Without employing explicitly such terminology, 2 Travel was putting forward reasoning, in 
terms of probabilities, that Cardiff’s Bus predatory conduct had caused the damage. 
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The CAT rejected the broader view of causation advanced by 2 Travel, finding it “vague”. It 
also held that intention alone cannot be said to be causative, in particular if the defendant 
has not taken any effective steps to cause such harm. The CAT seems to have relied on a 
clear distinction between factual causation and causation in law, normative aspects, such as 
the protective scope of competition law, exercising no influence on the assessment of 
causation in fact. The anticompetitive intent of Cardiff Bus, which could have been a factor 
considered in the analysis of the scope of the rule, was therefore found to be irrelevant in the 
analysis of the factual causation step. That said, the CAT engaged in a thorough but 
cautious analysis of the relevant counter-factual scenario, in particular exploring what 2 
Travel’s position would have been, had the “White Services” never operated. For example, 
with relation to the claim of a causative link between the decline of 2 Travel’s bus services 
and the infringement, the CAT found, on the balance of probabilities, that this falling off was 
due to 2 Travel’s “basic operational failings with its too hasty expansion of services” and not 
the infringement109. Also, with regard to loss of passengers and diversion of passenger 
revenue, the CAT engaged in a considerate analysis of the other options that passengers of 
“White Services” disposed and did not assume that all these passengers would have made 
the choice of 2 Travel’s bus service. The Tribunal also opted for a frequency-based 
allocation of passengers, in view of the importance the frequency of service had for 
consumers, adequately adjusted with a number of other factors. 
 
b. Germany 
In German tort law, the requirement of causation derives from the general part of the law of 
obligations relating to the general theory of the reparation of damage110. As in English law, 
the causal inquiry is bifurcated between a factual phase (“Kausalität im natürlichen Sinne” or 
natural causation) and a more normative/policy oriented one (“Kausalität im rechtlichen 
Sinne” or causation in the legal sense)111.  
 
With regard to the normative dimension, a distinction is made between causation giving rise 
to the violation of a protected interest or “causation as a foundation of liability” 
(“Haftungsbegrüdende Kausalität”), which links the conduct of the defendant and the 
infringement of a protected interest, and “causation as a determinant of the scope of liability” 
(Haftungsausfüllende Kausalität), which relates to the issue of the extent of damage112. 
While the first must be proved by the plaintiff, the second can be assessed by the court on 
the basis of available evidence113.  
 
The factual dimension of the causal inquiry in German tort law requires claimants to 
demonstrate the existence of an adequate causal nexus between the conduct (an act or an 
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omission) and the damage. This is undertaken under the equivalence of conditions test (the 
condition-sine-qua-non or but-for test)114. This is also complemented with the more 
generalizing theory of adequate cause (“Adäquanztheorie”). The theory has received 
different interpretation by German legal scholarship, some authors insisting on the idea that 
a cause of an ultimate event is the factor that departs from the ordinary course of events115, 
while others have relied on a probabilistic view of causation arguing that a fact should be 
considered as the adequate cause of the damage, if and only if, it has significantly increased 
the objective probability116 of the occurrence of the damage117. According to the formulations 
usually adopted by German courts, an event is the adequate cause of a particular result, “if 
(it) general increases, in a significant way, the objective probability of a result of the kind 
which occurred118” or, alternatively, the event would have been considered as an adequate 
cause of the damage, “if it could engender the damage in question only under particularly 
unique, improbable circumstances which would have been disregarded had events followed 
their usual course”119, “these probabilities being assessed from the point of view of an 
“optimal observer” which knows all the circumstances surrounding the injurious event which 
could be known at the time of that event and is furthermore equipped with the general 
experience of mankind”120. Hence, German law adopts the generalizing theory of adequate 
cause, essentially based on probabilities.  
 
German legal scholarship and the courts, have also developed the concept of the “scope of 
the rule” (”Schutzzweck der Norm”) in order to delimit the damages that can be recovered. 
The rule postulates that “an obligation to make reparation will only arise, if the damage 
claimed, according to its type and its origin, stems from a sphere of danger which the 
infringed norm was enacted to protect against”121. The theory inevitably introduces normative 
and policy considerations in the assessment of causation in fact, thus conflating with 
“causation as a foundation of liability” (“Haftungsbegrüdende Kausalität”), which, as we have 
previously highlighted, forms part of the normative phase of the causal inquiry. The concept 
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offers the necessary degree of flexibility to take into account the interests protected by the 
norm and the sphere of risks each of them should be expected to bear.  
 
With regard to causal uncertainty arising out of several tortfeasors causing the same 
damage, German law prefers the solution of the solidary liability of all defendants, as “it is 
thought that it should not be the victim’s risk to prove who caused which part of the 
damage”122. Where one of the several liable tortfeasors compensates the claimant for the full 
damage, the claimant may benefit from a redress/contribution claim towards the other 
tortfeasors (§426 BGB) 123. With regard to genuine causal uncertainty, the application of the 
generalizing theory of adequate cause is limited by its narrow confines and also the strict 
standards of proof applied in German law with regard to Haftungsbegrüdende Kausalität. In 
relation to the first limit, German tort law is satisfied not only with evidence that the 
defendant created a risk of harm and that the plaintiff suffered or may have suffered a risk-
related loss to establish causation in fact, but further requires “a strict limit – in time and 
space – between the defendant’s act and the damage, and that “(t)he particular risk which 
the defendant created and the particular situation must have been likely and apt to cause the 
concrete damage that ensued”124. If the conditions of liability are met and the damage is 
certain, then the defendant must compensate in full the damage, regardless of how minimal 
the defendant’s contribution in regard to causation or fault: “the slightest negligence leads to 
the establishment of full liability” (an all or nothing approach)125. In relation to the second 
limit, German law requires that the judge, who is allowed a free assessment of the evidence, 
is convinced (has a firm belief without any reasonable doubts remaining) that the factual 
allegation is or is not true and has the obligation to state the reasons that led him to this 
convinction126. To be convincing, a belief of probability should be close to certainty, thus a 
balance or probabilities standard will not be sufficient to carry conviction. According to some 
interpretations of the German civil procedure rules127, even a 99 per cent belief probability 
will not be considered sufficient, if for instance it relates to a fact probability of 51 per cent 
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that the defendant’s contribution caused the damage128. Hence, in these cases, in the 
absence of certainty, liability is unjustified, unless a specific causal presumption applies for 
fairness purposes, in which case the burden of proof shifts to the defendant. The general risk 
of uncertainty is thus borne by the claimant, although occasionally some procedural rules 
may facilitate the claimant’s burden (rules on prima facie evidence, proof proximity or the “so 
called secondary burden of evidence” for the defendant to establish the facts where the 
claimant has done what he reasonable could and the defendant has means to adduce 
further evidence)129. German tort law does not accept “market share” liability, nor the “loss of 
chance” doctrine130. With regard to future harm that remains uncertain, award will also be 
rejected, although if harm is certain but its extent (in the future) is uncertain, the German 
courts will assess this issue at the level of the quantification of damages 
(Haftungsausfüllende Kausalität), the standard of proof required in these cases being 
lower131. 
 
Damage claims for competition law infringements under section 33(1) of the German 
Competition Act (§ 33 Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen – GWB) require the 
establishment of causal connection between the cartel agreement and the damage suffered. 
Relevant in this respect is the so called theory of adequate causation (Adäquanztheorie),132 
as it has been developed in the context of German tort law: In principle, the cartel agreement 
must be sufficient to cause the specific financial loss suffered. Furthermore, it is required that 
the damage claimed (as defined by reference to the type, the level and the origin of the 
damage) be consistent with the protective purpose of the (allegedly) infringed provision.133  
 
Generally, the necessary causal link between the prohibited agreement and the damage 
claimed is not to be presumed. However, it seems that in practice the direct purchaser can 
easily prove the causal connection between the cartel agreement and the damage 
suffered.134 
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The situation is different with respect to the damage (i.e. the increased price) suffered by the 
indirect purchasers in subsequent market levels, where the pricing depends upon several 
factors related to the market structure and the prevailing commercial strategies. In fact, the 
increased price on a retail market might not be attributable to the cartel agreement on the 
upstream market, but rather to the (direct) purchaser’s pricing strategy, in light of her 
particular market position and/or the conditions in the next market level (as for instance, the 
price elasticity of demand and supply, the intensity of competition etc.).135 Accordingly, the 
causation requirement has to be assessed on a case-by-case basis.136 The damage is, thus, 
causally linked to the prohibited agreement, when most of the providers (direct purchasers) 
in the aftermarket have inflated their prices due to the cartel agreement on the upstream 
market. On the contrary, no causal connection can be asserted, where the price increase 
results from special commercial services or from the provider’s dominant position.137 In any 
event, the (direct) purchaser’s independent price fixing strategy does not interrupt the chain 
of causation between the initial cartel agreement and the price increase in the aftermarket.138 
 
Regard must also be had to the principle that it is upon the claimant bringing antitrust 
damages actions under Section 33(1) GWB to establish the causal connection between the 
cartel agreement and the damage suffered.139 As regards the applicable standard of proof, it 
is sufficient for the claimant to provide prima facie evidence of the causal link.140 
 
The ORWI case of the German Federal Court of Justice (BGH) constitutes the only example 
so far of a case in which the claim for damages was introduced by an indirect purchaser141. 
The plaintiff was a printer business which had purchased carbonless paper from a 
wholesaler, subsidiary of one of the paper producers fined by the Commission for 
participating to a price fixing cartel in the carbonless paper industry from 1992 until 1995. 
The printer business became insolvent and assigned its damages claims against the 
cartelists to the plaintiff, a German savings bank, which brought an action against the 
supplier. The action was dismissed by the Regional Court of Mannheim, finding that the 
customers of a subsidiary constitute indirect purchasers who may not claim damages. 
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Although the decision was partially confirmed by the Higher Regional Court of Karlsruhe, 
which nevertheless accepted the claim, by invoking that the wholesaler was a 100% 
subsidiary of the cartelists, and thus not providing the possibility for an action for damages in 
this case would have simply enabled cartel members to avoid liability by strategically using 
its subsidiary to supply customers142.  
 
The BGH nevertheless rejected the decision of the OLG Karlsruhe, thus allowing indirect 
purchasers to raise damages claims against the members of a cartel, at the same time, 
accepting the availability for the defendant of the passing-on defense. The BGH highlighted 
that it is the indirect purchaser alleging that the overcharge was passed on to the next 
market level who bears the burden of proving it, considering the theory of adequate 
causation, as it has been established in the framework of German tort law in accordance 
with EU Law, of relevance in this respect. The Court also stated that in view of the economic 
complexity inherent in pricing and competitive pressure in the downstream markets, a causal 
link between an overcharge in the aftermarket, which coincides in time with the prohibited 
agreement or practice under Article 101(1) TFEU, and the relevant cartel agreement may not 
be presumed, thus requiring a substantiation on a case by case basis of the causal link 
between the cartel agreement and the pricing in the next market level143. This causal link 
should be established by reference to the hypothetical price level in the absence of the 
cartel, in particular that the price increase is attributed to the cartel agreement, rather than 
other factors having impact on the pricing strategy. Indeed, as the Court explains, “the 
purchaser’s pricing strategy on the upstream market level is possibly not based on the 
conditions in the market where the cartel agreement is implemented, but rather on its 
particular market position and/or the specific conditions in the aftermarket”144. 
 
c. France 
In contrast to English and German law, article 1382 of the French Civil Code, employed as 
the legal basis for damages claims, puts in place a single heading of civil liability, espousing 
a general open-ended principle of liability without any a priori limits on the boundaries of the 
potential liability of the wrongdoer. In order to compensate for such a wide-ranging 
approach, French law incorporates strict causation in law (proximate cause) requirements, 
which also inevitably influence the choice of the causation test. Indeed, to be recoverable the 
damage should be certain, actual and direct145 and civil courts have occasionally referred to 
the notions of direct link, even when examining causation in fact146.  
 
With regard to the factual/non normative aspect of causation, French courts seem to take a 
variety of approaches. Some civil courts apply the individualizing “theory of equivalence of 
conditions” or sine qua non condition, according to which every factor contributing to the 
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occurrence of the effect should be considered as a cause147. In other words, all the 
conditions without which the effect would not have occurred are necessarily factual causes. 
Other courts adopt the generalizing “theory of adequate causation”, which involves a 
selection from the various conditions of the factor that depart from the ordinary course of 
events. However, French courts do not adopt a probability-based version of the adequate 
cause theory, preferring a version that emphasizes the departure from the ordinary course of 
events, for instance by the interference of a third party or the plaintiff, or a natural event, 
following the occurrence of the condition generated by the defendant’s conduct, which is 
unforeseeable (“imprévisible”) and unavoidable (“irresistible”), without however making any 
explicit or implicit reference to probabilities148.  
 
French tort law has predominately chosen to by-pass situations of causal uncertainty 
through the concept of loss of chance (“perte de chance”), which has allowed French courts 
to express the causal impact of the defendant’s conduct in probabilistic terms. In particular, 
French courts employ the “perte de chance” doctrine as a response to scientific uncertainty 
as to the existence of a causal link between the condition and the result, responsibility in 
solidum being mostly used for evidential uncertainty with regard to multiple tortfeasors149. 
Loss of chance enables French courts to conceal scientific uncertainty, as loss of a chance 
is defined as a specific head of damage, which is certain, as far as this concerns the loss of 
a favourable opportunity for the claimant. The compensation “must correspond to a share of 
the victim’s various heads of damage” and “lower courts must to that effect assess each 
head of damage and decide the proportion to which it constitutes a reparable loss of a 
chance”150. This comes close to the apportionment which may be undertaken under 
proportional liability, although here the damage is considered as “certain” (in view of the 
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strict requirements of the standard of proof for damages in France). The solution of French 
tort law is therefore markedly different from that adopted in the context of German tort law 
and to a certain degree English law, which prefer instead to respond to causal uncertainty 
with procedural rules, such as reversing the burden of proof to the defendant, rather than 
substantive principles such as the establishment of a specific type of damages for loss of 
chance. Although compensation for future hypothetical harm is not awarded, it is possible to 
compensate future loss when “all the conditions for its existence in the future already exist at 
the time of the facts”151. The concept of loss of a chance may provide a possible way out in 
such situations as well as situations where the scope of the future harm is uncertain. 
 
Causation jurisprudence in competition law cases in France is intrinsically linked with the 
doctrine of loss of a chance (“perte de chance”), which provides an escape valve to the strict 
requirements of certainty and directness of the causal link between the damage and the 
infringement, although this is not also without limits. We will comment on some cases that 
highlight the specificities of competition law causation jurisprudence in France. 
 
The decision of the European Commission sanctioning the lysine price-fixing cartel has led 
to a number of follow-on damages claims in French courts by purchasers of lysine, active in 
various downstream markets, which saw their commercial margins affected by the cartel 
overcharge. Yet, despite the existence of a Commission infringement decision purchasers 
have faced substantial difficulties in actions for damages.  
 
For instance, the Doux group, Europe’s largest producer of poultry claimed, relying on an 
expert report, that the lysine cartel led to an increase of 30% in the price of lysine, as a result 
of which it suffered damage, due to reduced margins and a drop in competitiveness, which 
amounted to 30 per cent of its purchases of lysine during the period of the cartel. Ajinamoto 
Eurolysine, the defendant in the action and an addressee of the Commission’s infringement 
decision argued that Doux has passed on the overcharge to its consumers and that in any 
case the expert report on which Doux’s claim relied was imprecise and did not account for 
the important fluctuations of the price of lysine during this period.  
 
The Court of appeal of Paris rejected Ajinamoto’s first argument and used the loss of chance 
doctrine in order to respond to the second, thus finding that Doux had suffered a loss of a 
chance that had to be compensated to the level of 30 per cent of the amount of damages 
requested152. No explanation was provided in the judgment in the choice of the 30 per cent 
figure, presumably referring to the probability of occurrence of the loss of the chance in this 
case. The French Supreme Court quashed the judgment of the Court of appeal on several 
grounds153. First, it held that the Court of appeal should have considered the possibility that 
Doux could have passed on the overcharge to its consumers, thus requiring the 
consideration of an eventual passing on of an overcharge, but more controversially 
allocating to the claimant the burden to prove that no pass on was effectuated in the 
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circumstances of the case154. This is of course incompatible with Article 13 of the Damages 
Directive, which places the burden of proof on the defendant (passing on is considered as a 
defence). Second, it held that the causal link between the damage and the fault/infringement 
should not be hypothetical, noting that the “erratic” fluctuations of the lysine price during the 
cartel period did not enable the court to make an inference of causal link between the 
damage suffered and the infringement, this appearing purely hypothetical in this context.  
 
The case was then sent back to a different formation of the Paris Court of Appeal for 
reconsideration155. The claimants were arguing three heads, one principal and two 
subsidiary. The principal consisted in compensation of the loss suffered during the period of 
the cartel; the subsidiaries related to the loss of a chance and the disgorgement of the illicit 
profits (referring to the cartel overcharge). The Court of appeal considered the possibility of a 
preliminary ruling question to the Court of Justice on the issue of who bears the burden of 
proof for an eventual pass on of an overcharge, yet it found that the issue was clearly settled 
by the case law of the French Supreme Court and that this interpretation of Article 1382 of 
the French Civil Code did not conflict with the principles of equivalence and effectiveness. It 
decided eventually not to send any preliminary question to the CJEU on this issue. The 
reader is reminded that the recently adopted Damages Directive proceeds to an EU 
harmonization of the matter by instituting a passing on defence. The Court of appeal of Paris 
then proceeded to examine the principal head of damages claimed by the Doux group to find 
that although the expert report submitted by the claimants at first instance relied on, in some 
instances, imprecise methods, these findings were based on the “incontestable” data 
contained in the Commission’s decision and therefore proved beyond doubt the surcharge 
suffered by Doux and the subsequent damages engendered by the additional expenses 
incurred in order to mitigate the results of the price increase.  
 
The French courts have had recourse to the doctrine of the loss of chance in more than one 
occasion. For instance, in SA Concurrence v/ SA Aiwa, the Court of appeal of Versailles had 
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to assess the damage a discounter had suffered as a result of the selective rebates policy 
adopted by one of its suppliers, which benefitted only to some of its competitors156. The 
Court analysed the damage as a loss of chance to make additional sales, and taking into 
account the volume of sales of the discounter, its usual margin and the purchases it made 
from the supplier during the period of the infringement, the court granted damages that 
corresponded to less than one sixth of the amount initially requested by the claimant. In M. 
Merhi Bassam v. SNC SPPS, the Court of appeal of Paris also employed the loss of chance 
doctrine to provide compensation to a potential buyer of a newspapers’ stall who was 
excluded from the distribution network of SNC SPPS, the dominant distribution channel for 
newspapers in the Paris region, for having rejected the presumably abusive clauses of the 
latter’s standard contract, on the basis of the existence of an agreement with the previous 
owner of the newspaper stall to transfer the property rights on the stall subject to the 
approval of SNC SPPS157. Hence, the damage occurred was not hypothetical, as its 
occurrence relied on past events (the sale of the stall). 
 
2. Causation standards and categories of claimants 
Although the jurisprudence of the CJEU and/or the Damages Directive do not restrict the 
category of possible claimants in actions for damages and take the widest possible approach 
with regard to standing158, in practice, it may be more difficult to establish causation in 
bringing successful damages actions159  for parties who are not direct purchasers or 
competitors of the infringers. There are several parties that might be affected by a 
competition law infringement, such as a cartel agreement.  
 
First, there are direct purchasers/customers that purchase goods or services directly by the 
infringer. These customers forgo the benefit of additional sales in the form of utility in 
consumption or profit when resold to the final customer in a competitive environment.  
 
An equivalent effect occurs for upstream suppliers. By exercising buyer power a cartel may 
enforce lower input prices upstream. Depending on the specific market conditions, input 
price reduction may be enforced by the cartel through output contraction affecting both 
existing and potential suppliers. Moreover, upstream suppliers may (partially) pass-on the 
worsened sales conditions to their own upstream suppliers.  
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Indirect purchasers, purchasing goods or services from a downstream supplier of the 
infringer may also be affected where the overcharge was passed on to their level.   
 
Exclusionary practices may affect (potential) competitors outside the cartel. Competitors in 
the same relevant market that are not participating in the cartel agreement, or potential 
competitors in related product or neighbouring regional markets, are potentially affected by 
exclusionary practices.  
 
The opposite can also happen: competitors outside the cartel could benefit by softened 
competition, enjoying higher prices due to the cartel (the so-called umbrella effect). The 
direct customers of these competitors may suffer an overcharge because of the umbrella 
effects.  
 
Finally, one should also account of the effect on potential customers (intermediate 
customers or end consumers) who would have purchased the products or services directly 
or indirectly from the infringers in the absence of the infringement (counterfactual 
customers). These suffer harm in view of the fact that they did not purchase the product or 
service, although they would have done so if charged the counterfactual price, or they are 
pushed to purchase less-preferred alternative products and services.  
 
Other injured parties may include employees, where the undertaking for which they worked 
goes bankrupt and consequently they lose their employment160, or shareholders, where the 
shares of the undertaking they have invested in, victim of the anticompetitive conduct, 
dropped, following the anticompetitive/exclusionary conduct. 
 
There is also a significant “structural asymmetry in the distribution of information required by 
claimants to prove causation161. As the Commission recognized in the Staff Working paper 
accompanying its 2008 White Paper:  
“Even where claimants are in a position to describe and prove the factual elements 
necessary for finding an infringement, having to demonstrate in detail the causation and 
quantification of their damages remains a particular difficulty in competition cases. To 
establish their damage, claimants have to compare the anti-competitive situation to a 
situation which would have existed in the absence of the infringement, i.e. a hypothetical 
competitive market. In a breach of contract case, a claimant can normally use market 
prices at the time of the breach of contract as the benchmark for calculating his loss. 
However, in a typical competition case, the claimant cannot rely on the prices at the time 
of the infringement and has to establish what the price would have been in the absence 
of the restriction of competition. For this purpose, he will often depend on information 
that is in the sphere of the defendant and possibly their partners in the infringement: for 
example, notes on the price overcharges agreed secretly between cartel members, 
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details on how and when they influenced price and other parameters of competition, or 
internal documents of the infringer showing his analysis of market conditions and 
developments. Also the reconstruction of a hypothetical competitive market to quantify 
the damage caused by the infringer usually presupposes knowledge of facts on the 
commercial activities of the infringer and other players on the relevant market. The same 
or similar types of difficulty arise in the context of causation, e.g. when claimants try to 
identify the precise elements of anti-competitive behaviour by an infringer that have 
caused the claimants damage, or the extent to which several infringers have individually 
contributed to the damage caused”162 
 
A careful analysis of the damages cases for infringement of competition law brought in the 
most significant jurisdictions in Europe, in terms of the size of their economy and number of 
cases, shows that, in the overwhelming majority of cases, damages actions are brought by 
direct purchasers or competitors, and it is extremely rare they are introduced by indirect 
purchasers. We have not been able to identify one case in which the damage claim was 
initiated by counterfactual direct (or indirect) purchasers. A possible explanation for this 
phenomenon is that it is often difficult to identify these counterfactual customers and 
measure with certainty the harm incurred. Indeed, it is difficult to establish how much a 
counterfactual customer would have bought, in the event that he was charged the 
counterfactual price. Any finding will be subject to uncertainty and assumptions about the 
probable behavior of the counterfactual customer and his preferences. Requirements of 
certainty and foreseeability may curb the ability of those customers to receive compensation 
for the harm incurred. Similar difficulties persist with indirect purchasers or end customers 
who are only considered if there is plausible evidence of passing on163. In the absence of 
passing on, the causality link between them and the infringer is broken. It is also clear that 
counterfactual customers resulting from the volume effect (customers not buying the product 
from the indirect purchasers as a result of the price increase following the passing on of the 
overcharge) may not be able to receive compensation. Competitors may also be unable to 
overcome the strict requirements of causation, with regard to eventual lost profits resulting 
from the competition law infringement, in view of the limits of the counterfactual inquiry. 
 
3. Different strategies of EU “harmonization” of causation requirements in competition 
law based actions for damages 
In the absence of a clear definition of causation in the different legal systems of the EU 
Member States164, any effort to define a uniform test for establishing causation in fact and 
causation in law remains a Sisyphean task. The Damages Directive does not proceed to the 
development of harmonized rules on causation, but only includes provisions that relate to 
causation, by advancing causal presumptions favouring certain categories of defendants (a). 
Hence, with regard to causation, the reference in Manfredi to “the legal system of each 
Member State to prescribe the detailed rules governing the exercise of [the] right [to 
                                                          
162
 Staff working paper accompanying the White Paper on Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules 
COM(2008) 165 final, para. 89. 
163
 See, however, the causal presumption introduced by the Damages Directive in order to deal with this issue 
examined infra. 
164
 See, for instance Notes to VI.-4.101 of the Common Frame of Reference, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/civil/docs/dcfr_outline_edition_en.pdf , p. 3422: “The term “causation” is 
used in all European systems of legal liability, but is nowhere defined”. 
39 
 
damages], including those on the application of the concept of ‘causal relationship”, remains 
unchanged. The Court of Justice judgment in Kone provides a first glance on the emergent 
EU rules on causation, in order to ensure the effectiveness of the right to claim damages for 
a certain category, umbrella customers, which might find themselves disadvantaged by strict 
national tort law requirements on causation (b).  
 
a. Causation in the Damages Directive 
Although the declared aim of the Damages Directive is the “approximation” of national rules, 
with the view to “prevent the emergence of wider differences between the Member States’ 
rules governing actions for damages in competition cases”165, the Directive observes that the 
issue of the causal relationship “is not dealt with in this Directive” and makes explicit 
reference to national rules and procedures to deal with this issue, under the dual framing of 
the principles of effectiveness and equivalence, following the well -established case law of 
the EU Courts on this issue166. Yet, the Directive mentions explicitly that compensation for 
harm suffered may be claimed from any person, subject to the requirement of a causal 
relationship between the harm suffered and the infringement of the competition law167. In 
contrast to US law, the Directive takes an open approach to standing (as any injured party 
may claim full compensation of the harm168), while leaving to the requirement of causation 
the function of potentially circumscribing damages claims169. These potential limitations to 
claims for damages should nonetheless be implemented in accordance with the principle of 
effectiveness, which imposed to Member States the obligation to ensure the effective 
exercise of the “subjective” right to claim damages for infringements of competition law170. 
Although the principle of effectiveness is defined negatively in the directive171, the 
“substantive effectiveness” of the exercise of the right might also be perceived positively as 
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the “right to full compensation” for the harm “caused”172, without that of course leading to 
overcompensation, thus indicating the central function of the causation element in the EU 
framework and the need to implement this in a relatively liberal way.  
 
The Directive contains provisions that illustrate the need to enhance full compensation by 
facilitating the evidence of a causal link in certain specific circumstances.  
 
First, direct or subsequent purchasers may claim compensation for the overcharge, that is, 
the “difference between the price actually paid and the price that would have prevailed in the 
absence of an infringement of competition law”173. This may be more than the harm incurred, 
had the purchasers passed on the overcharge or part of it to their consumers (their harm is 
the overcharge-pass on). The infringer may of course raise a passing on defence, by proving 
the existence and the extent of the pass-on of the overcharge174. Yet, the practical 
implication of such a theoretical construction is that it leads to a reversal of the burden of 
proof to the infringer, who needs to establish the existence of the pass on (as pass on 
constitutes a defence), instead of requiring the claimants to bring only evidence of the 
specific harm caused to them by the infringer (thus taking into account in defining their harm 
the possible pass on of the overcharge).  
 
Second, the Directive puts in place a presumption of causality for the benefit of indirect 
purchasers only, in view of the difficulties of “consumers or undertakings that did not 
themselves make any purchase from the infringer to prove the scope of that harm”175. 
Hence, as it is explained by the Directive, “taking into account the commercial practice that 
price increases are passed on down the supply chain176”, it is “appropriate to provide that, 
where the existence of a claim for damages or the amount to be awarded depends on 
whether or to what degree an overcharge paid by the direct purchaser of the infringer has 
been passed on to the indirect purchaser, the latter is regarded as having brought the proof 
that an overcharge paid by that direct purchaser has been passed on to his level, where he 
is able to show prima facie that such passing-on has occurred, unless the infringer can 
credibly demonstrate to the satisfaction of the court that the actual loss has not or not 
entirely been passed on to the indirect purchaser”177. Hence, the indirect purchaser may 
carry more easily the burden of proof of the existence and scope of pass on by simply 
providing prima facie evidence that “(a) the defendant has committed an infringement of 
competition law; (b) the infringement of competition law resulted in an overcharge for the 
direct purchaser of the defendant; and (c) the indirect purchaser has purchased the goods or 
services that were the object of the infringement of competition law, or has purchased goods 
or services derived from or containing them”178. 
 
Third, the Damages Directive sets up a causal presumption for cartels in order to “remedy 
the information asymmetry and some of the difficulties associated with quantifying antitrust 
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harm, and to ensure the effectiveness of claims for damages”179. As is explained in the 
Directive, 
“it is appropriate to presume that cartel infringements result in harm, in particular via an 
effect on prices. Depending on the facts of the case, cartels result in a rise in prices, or 
prevent a lowering of prices which would otherwise have occurred but for the cartel. This 
presumption should not cover the concrete amount of harm”180. 
 
Such presumption may result from the Commission’s reliance on studies indicating that only 
7 per cent of cartels do not lead to overcharging and more generally enforcement 
priorities181. Accordingly, the Directive requires Member States to establish a presumption 
that cartel infringements cause harm, also recognizing the right to the infringer to rebut this 
presumption182. 
 
Of particular interest is the strategy followed by the Directive in relation to conduct by 
multiple defendants causing harm. The Directive holds undertakings jointly infringing 
competition law (e.g. cartels but also other forms of competition law infringement, resulting 
from other horizontal or vertical agreements, the abuse of a collective dominant position) 
jointly and severally liable for the “entire harm caused by the infringement”183. The Directive 
thus adopts the solution of responsibility in solidum, instead of engaging in the application of 
the equivalence of condition test (“but-for test”), which would have led to the finding of no 
liability where the decision-maker is faced with multiple sufficient causes or considers the 
problem to be a causation issue by applying the generalizing theory of adequate causation 
or the individualizing efficiency theory of causation in order to determine the relevant cause. 
Yet, causation issue is not entirely irrelevant as it is indirectly applicable in the context of the 
subsequent right recognized by the Directive of the infringing undertaking to recover the 
overpaid contribution from any other infringing undertaking, the amount of which is 
determined “in light of their relative responsibility for the harm caused by the infringement of 
competition law”184. Hence, liability is divided according to the probability that one or other 
caused the harm. According to the Directive, “(t)he determination of that share as the relative 
responsibility of a given infringer and the relevant criteria, such as turnover, market share, or 
role in the cartel, is a matter for the applicable national law, while respecting the principles of 
effectiveness and equivalence”185. The Directive thus opens the door to a possible 
implementation of the market shares rule or any other proportional apportionment principle 
developed by each Member State, which, as we have previously explained, constitutes an 
alternative to the determination of causation in fact.  
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In the case of an infringement of Article 101 TFEU following the cumulative foreclosure effect 
of parallel networks of distribution agreements, such as in Delimitis186, the suppliers whose 
networks of distribution agreements would have been found to contribute to the cumulative 
foreclosure effect and hence to infringe Article 101 TFEU would be found jointly and 
severally liable for the entire harm caused by the infringement. This even if the cumulative 
effect would have also resulted without the intervention of their network, if the contribution of 
their network to the cumulative effect is not substantial, but is of a level to be considered an 
infringement of Article 101 TFEU187. The application of the “but-for” test would have resulted 
in no liability being found in such circumstances, as the condition (the network of distribution 
agreements) would not have been necessary for the occurrence of the harm. Yet, the 
contribution of each network of similar agreements to the cumulative effect would be of 
relevance when determining the apportionment of the damages between the different 
infringers found jointly and severally liable, should one of them request the recovery from 
any other infringing undertaking of the damages paid in excess of its relative responsibility. 
In this case, reference may be made to the respective market shares of the undertaking 
and/or its share of the cumulative effect, as determined in the context of the second step of 
the Delimitis test. 
 
Yet the Damages Directive does not provide for equivalent presumptions of causality for 
injured parties other than indirect purchasers, such as counterfactual customers, and 
umbrella customers, who may find it difficult to prove the causal link between the 
anticompetitive conduct of the defendant and the harm they suffered. Harm is also defined 
narrowly as only referring to the higher prices paid as a result of the anticompetitive conduct 
or reduced sales leading to a loss of profit, without the Directive making any reference to 
other types of harm that may result from an anticompetitive exercise of market power, such 
as a reduction of consumer choice, or reduction of innovation or quality, which do not benefit 
from equivalent causal presumptions188. It follows that the EU Courts will inevitably be called, 
not only to interpret the provisions of the Directive, but also to fill in the numerous areas of 
the law on which the Directive remains silent. One of these is the issue of causation. A 
recent preliminary ruling procedure at the CJEU has precisely examined this issue. 
 
b. Causation in the CJEU: umbrella customers and the emergence of the approximation 
by jurisprudence method 
Inasmuch as both the CJEU and the EU Legislator have emphasized that full compensation 
of anyone harmed is the cornerstone of the EU law on damages claims for competition law 
infringements, the case law and the legislative proposals remain silent as to the possibility of 
injured parties that are remote in the “vertical value chain189” of the infringer190, or customers 
who are not part of the vertical value chain, such as counterfactual or umbrella customers.  
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With regard to the first type of customers, the Commission’s proposal for the Damages 
Directive acknowledged that remoteness or foreseeability requirements may make it legally 
“impossible” for certain categories of indirect purchasers in a remote position of the vertical 
value chain to claim full compensation. The solution advanced by the Commission provided 
that “in a situation where the overcharge was passed on to persons who are legally unable 
to claim compensation, it is not appropriate to allow the infringing undertaking to invoke the 
passing-on defence, as this would render it free of liability for the harm which it has 
caused”191. No equivalent provision exists in the final version of the Directive, thus indicating 
that if such an issue emerges, it will have to be dealt by the national courts and eventually 
the CJEU. 
 
With regard to the second category of customers, the recent reference for a preliminary 
ruling from the Austrian Supreme Court to the CJEU in KONE AG and Others arising against 
the background of the elevator cartel case, illustrates some of the questions to which the 
CJEU will inevitably be asked to elucidate. The Austrian Supreme Court’s question was 
formulated by the national court as referring to the issue of standing, as it questioned the 
CJEU whether "any person may claim from members of a cartel damages also for the loss 
which he has been caused by a person not party to the cartel who, benefiting from the 
protection of the increased market prices, raises his own prices for his products more than 
he would have done without the cartel (umbrella pricing)192”, but it implicitly essentially raised 
an issue of causation, as it concerned a question, “not yet settled at European Union level, 
of whether the civil liability in damages of the members of a cartel also extends to ‘umbrella 
effects’ or ‘umbrella pricing’”193. AG Kokott reformulated the question in order to address two 
issues (standing and causation) explaining that  
“(t)here is said to be umbrella pricing when undertakings that are not themselves party to 
a cartel, benefiting from the protection of the cartel’s practices (operating ‘under the 
cartel’s umbrella’, so to speak), knowingly or unknowingly set their own prices higher 
than they would otherwise have been able to under competitive conditions. Does 
European Union law require that customers of undertakings not party to the cartel should 
be able to claim compensation for the inflated prices charged by those undertakings from 
the members of the cartel before the national courts? [the standing issue] Or, conversely, 
may such an obligation to award compensation be excluded in national civil law on the 
ground that the loss suffered is indirect and too remote? [the causation issue]194”. 
Yet, as it further explained the issue of causation was the most crucial one as 
“(f)rom a legal point of view, the issue of whether members of cartels can also be held 
civilly liable for umbrella pricing hangs on the existence or otherwise of a causal link. The 
question is whether there is a sufficiently close connection between the cartel and the 
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losses resulting from umbrella pricing caused by a cartel, or whether these are 
excessively remote losses for which damages cannot reasonably be awarded against 
the members of the cartel”195. 
 
The injured party claiming damages had indeed purchased elevators from a manufacturer 
not involved in the cartel, paying a price which in its opinion was set under the protection of 
the elevator cartel and was thus higher than would otherwise have been expected under 
competitive conditions. However, the implementation of Austrian tort law dismissed “from the 
outset” such claim for compensation, because according to the Austrian courts the loss on 
account of which the injured party had brought its action could not be attributed to the parties 
to the cartel on legal grounds. First, the adequate causal link required under Austrian law 
was not present, and second, the loss alleged was not deemed covered by the protective 
purpose of the competition rules196. The Austrian court had doubts as to the application of 
the restrictive national tort law rules in view of the principle of effectiveness.  
 
Advocate general Kokott developed a threefold strategy in order to provide a reply to the 
referring court and bring causation issues within the scope of the institutional competence of 
the EU court to provide an interpretation of EU law. Although the CJEU did not follow that 
strategy in its final judgment, and preferred a more “traditional” approach, relying on the 
principles of effectiveness and equivalence, Advocate General Kokott’s Opinion provides an 
interesting blueprint on what an EU rule on causation would look like, if the CJEU had 
decided to proceed to some harmonized EU rule on the existence of a causal link. 
 
The first part consisted in linking the issue of causation, which the CJEU in Manfredi 
addressed as an issue to be dealt with by the domestic legal system of each Member State, 
within the ambit of EU law. To do so, AG Kokott introduced a distinction between the 
existence or the constitutive rules of the right to claim damages for competition law 
infringement (“the question of whether compensation is to be granted”), which is an issue of 
EU law, and “the details of application of such claims and the rules for their actual 
enforcement” (“the question of how compensation is to be granted”), which are left to 
domestic legal systems. The AG then mentioned the “direct anchoring” of the principle that 
any individual is entitled to claim compensation for loss sustained in the presence of a 
causal relationship between the loss and the infringement of EU law. She based her 
interpretation on a variety of grounds: the need for consistency within the EU system of 
liability of Member States for their infringements of EU law, the direct effect of Articles 101 
and 102 TFEU, and the principle of the “effet utile” of EU law. Having established that 
constitutive principles emanate from and are determined by EU law, the AG classified the 
question of the recoverability of losses engendered by umbrella pricing as relating to the 
“fundamental question of whether (cartel members) can be sued by persons who are not 
their direct or indirect customers197”, thus formulating the issue as being conceptually close 
to the questions of standing and the types of losses that are recoverable under EU law, 
which have already been determined by EU law198. Consequently, the AG felt that EU law 
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also regulated the issue of the establishment of a causal link. Surprisingly, she did not make 
any reference to the principle of supremacy of EU law, which should have entered into play 
in the presence of a conflicting national rule, had this issue, as she advocated, being one 
regulated by EU law. 
 
The second part of AG’s Opinion considered “the specific conditions” that “may be attached 
under European law to the establishment of a causal link between a cartel and umbrella 
pricing”199. One may consider that this issue relates more to the question of “how 
compensation is to be granted”, the modalities of compensation, rather than the constitutive 
rules of “whether compensation should be granted”, yet the a priori practically exclusion of 
claims introduced by umbrella customers under Austrian law enabled the AG to conflate the 
two issues in order to provide a useful answer to the national court. The AG proceeded to 
elaborate on some broad principles of EU causation law, such as a reference to the conditio 
sine qua non or “but for causal link”, the requirement of a “sufficiently direct causal nexus” in 
the implementation of Article 340 TFEU on the liability of Member States for infringement of 
EU law or some EU merger cases, and the importance of a “normative examination” in 
establishing legal causation leading to the identification in all European legal systems, 
despite the different terminology employed (“legal causation, adaquat Kausalität and the 
like”), of normative principles that “inform the concept of a sufficiently direct causal link”200. 
By separating the causation in fact from the causation in law or “scope of the liability” 
element, AG Kokott seems to have aimed to bring the second within the scope of the 
constitutive rules of the right to claim damages, and thus under the ambit of EU law, while 
leaving causation in fact to be determined according to the techniques developed in each 
domestic legal system. Of course, as we have previously shown, the distinction is somehow 
artificial as ultimately the two issues are profoundly interlinked. Yet, this approach enabled 
AG Kokott to comment freely on the way the requirement of causal link should be interpreted 
as a matter of EU law. She stressed that the requirement of “a direct causal link must not be 
regarded as being the same as a single causal link” and that “there is sufficient support for 
the assumption of a direct causal link if the cartel was at least a contributory cause of the 
umbrella pricing”201. The aim was of course to deal with situations of multiple causes, which 
are frequent, if not always the case, in the implementation of EU competition law, because of 
the intervention of the conduct of a third party in the realization of the harm. This is 
intrinsically linked to the normal operation of the market system and the fact that 
undertakings are “(also) guided by the relevant trading conditions”, which may occasionally 
break the causal chain202. According to AG Kokott, such issues are also raised with regard to 
indirect purchasers who are not denied under EU law the possibility of claiming damages 
even if the incurrence of their loss “is ultimately dictated by the freely-made corporate 
decision of a third party (the intermediary trader)”203.In any case, “(p)rices rarely have only 
one cause”, hence “it would be unreasonable to make the civil liability of cartel members 
subject to the condition of their being the single cause”204. That led the AG to espouse a 
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relatively broad concept of cause, by accepting that a simple contribution of the conduct 
“towards a distortion of the price formation mechanisms that normally apply on the market in 
question” may constitute relevant cause. That potentially very broad liability principle 
announced, the AG then addressed the issue of the necessary limitation of its scope. 
 
This constitutes the third step in the strategy of AG Kokott to develop broader EU causation 
rules. The AG clearly indicated that “the criterion of a sufficiently direct causal link is in 
substance intended, on the one hand, to ensure that a person who has acted unlawfully is 
liable only for such loss as he could reasonably have foreseen” and “(o)n the other hand, a 
person is liable only for loss the compensation of which is consistent with the objectives of 
the provision of law which he has infringed”205. With regard to the first issue, the AG 
distinguished the situation of “umbrella pricing” which is foreseeable by cartel members from 
“loss which results from an entirely extraordinary train of events, and therefore, ensues via 
an atypical causal chain”206. Her main argument was that essentially that was “very much in 
the normal way of things” and that cartel members should have expected that non cartel 
members would have raised their prices as a result of the cartel, in comparison to the prices 
in the absence of the cartel, such behaviour being “far from unusual” and “economically 
rational”, and thus foreseeable by the members of the cartel but also in the interest of the 
cartel members, in order to ensure the success of their cartel207. But more important for the 
reasoning of the AG was to link such an interpretation of the causation in law requirement 
with the protective scope of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, transposing in EU law, the “scope of 
the rule” doctrine of German tort law208. Summarizing a highly interesting discussion, AG 
Kokott referred to the compensatory aim of EU competition law enforcement and to 
deterrence, perceived not as an efficiency objective, but an expression of corrective 
justice209. Such interpretation of the scope of protection of EU competition law opens the 
gate to enforcement by anyone incurring some form of harm (economic and moral?) to which 
a competition law infringement may have contributed. This is not a narrow definition of the 
scope of protection, and AG Kokott understands that well, as she mentions that no 
overloading of national courts with claims from injured parties by umbrella pricing is to be 
expected, in view of “the relatively high hurdles in terms of burden of proof210” that await 
such claimants in the civil courts, suggesting that “any potential ‘umbrella plaintiff” “weigh up 
carefully the pros and cons of taking out a civil action against cartel members”211. Finally, no 
evidence of fault or intent is required, the existence of a causal link being based on “purely 
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objective criteria”, hence, mere negligence is sufficient212. The only limit to the extent of the 
losses that umbrella customers may request compensation from cartel members is the 
principle of “overcompensation”, which is defined by AG Kokott as being conceptually linked 
to the issue of causation, as it “requires cartel members only to make good the loss which 
they have caused (or to which they have contributed) on the market in question by their anti-
competitive practices”, which is actually somewhat tautological in view of the weak standard 
of causation required by the AG (a simple “contribution”). 
 
The CJEU did not follow the full strategy proposed by AG Kokott and re-affirmed the 
preference for national law to deal with causation issues, under the double discipline of the 
principles of effectiveness and equivalence. The Court confirmed once again that “it is, in 
principle, for the domestic legal system of each Member State to lay down the detailed rules 
governing the application of the concept of the ‘causal link’”, and that “national legislation 
must ensure that European Union competition law is fully effective”213. Effectiveness in this 
context was interpreted as requiring national rules on causation to “specifically take into 
account the objective pursued by Article 101 TFEU, which aims to guarantee effective and 
undistorted competition in the internal market, and, accordingly, prices set on the basis of 
free competition” and the need to “recognise the right of any individual to claim 
compensation for loss sustained”214. Effectiveness would have been “put at risk if the right of 
any individual to claim compensation for harm suffered were subjected by national law, 
categorically and regardless of the particular circumstances of the case, to the existence of a 
direct causal link while excluding that right because the individual concerned had no 
contractual links with a member of the cartel, but with an undertaking not party thereto”215. 
According to the Court, this causal link cannot be excluded in principle as the pricing policy 
of the undertaking inflicting damage to umbrella customers, “is a result of the cartel that 
contributed to the distortion of price formation mechanisms governing competitive 
markets”216. By emphasizing “contribution” as a sufficient element for establishing a causal 
link in these circumstances, the CJEU seems to frame the minimum core required in the 
definition of the causal link for that to ensure the effectiveness of EU competition law 
prohibitions. The exclusion of a category of victims, umbrella customers, is not compatible 
with this minimum EU law defined core. 
 
c. Towards a broad and instrumental conception of causation in EU competition law on 
damages actions 
As it has been rightly observed by some commentators217, the opinion of AG Kokott relied 
greatly on the evidence put forward by the parties, being relatively agnostic as to the “merits” 
of the case beforehand, based on some categorical analysis of the “type” of claim or loss 
brought. As the AG herself puts it, “it will always be necessary to carry out a comprehensive 
assessment of all the relevant circumstances in order to determine whether the cartel in the 
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case in question has given rise to umbrella pricing”218. Furthermore, “(s)hifting the umbrella 
pricing issue from the level of pure theory to that of the production of evidence seems to me 
to be the best way of contributing to the effective enforcement of the European competition 
rules, while taking due account of the interests of all economic operators”219. Indeed, harm 
resulting from umbrella pricing is neither “speculative”, nor “uncertain”220. Looking at the 
facts, a “categorical exclusion” of such harm (through standing or causation rules), would not 
make much sense221. The CJEU also agreed that “a loss being suffered by the customer of 
an undertaking not party to a cartel, but benefiting from the economic conditions of umbrella 
pricing, because of an offer price higher than it would have been but for the existence of that 
cartel is one of the possible effects of the cartel, that the members thereof cannot disregard”, 
although it did not get into a detailed examination of the topic, which in any case is not 
expected by the CJEU in a preliminary ruling procedure. The possibility that a cartel 
contributed to high prices for umbrella customers “cannot be ruled out”, which implies that a 
categorical rule excluding umbrella customers, would affect the legitimate right of certain 
victims of competition law infringements to receive compensation. The third party 
intervention in this context does not break the causal link between the cartel and the 
damage. However, the CJEU did not provide guidance as to the causal test that would apply 
in order to assess the individual circumstances of the case and conclude, or not, on the 
existence of a causal link. The only guidance provided consists in affirming that 
“contribution” may be a sufficient factor in establishing causation. 
 
The introduction by AG Kokott in her Opinion in KONE AG of the “scope of the rule” doctrine 
of German law as a principle of EU law in the assessment of causation could have had 
important implications as to the development of the EU law on damages claims for 
competition law infringements. First, her conception of the causal link as “contribution”, 
which was accepted by the CJEU, may lead to a broad interpretation of the causation in law 
and causation in fact requirements. Second, her broad interpretation of the scope of 
protection of competition law provides the basis for the development by the case law of the 
EU Courts of flexible causation rules for damages actions brought for EU competition law 
infringements that will take into account the specificities of antitrust damages claims, in 
comparison with torts for other kinds of injuries. This may indeed provide for flexible rules in 
order to assess the merely economic damage suffered and the use of economic and 
econometric evidence. This part of her strategy was not followed by the CJEU. 
 
It is important here to note the close-ended character of the counterfactual inquiry in law. 
The objective is not to speculate on any imaginable turn of events and hypothetical 
scenarios or the most likely alternative cause of action for the actors involved, which would 
be a “hopelessly indeterminate” and “inevitably influenced by policy-based conventions, 
expectations, or goals”, but, as is explained by Wright, instead to determine “the causal 
processes at work, in the one scenario that did happen”222. Hence, we usually proceed by 
eliminating the condition being tested from the sufficient set of actual antecedent conditions 
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in order to determine “by matching the remaining conditions in the set against the applicable 
causal generalization”, “whether the set still would be sufficient for the occurrence of the 
result”223. Resolving this causal inquiry depends, according to Wright, on “our empirical 
knowledge of the conditions that existed and the possibly applicable causal generalizations, 
not on policy considerations224”. Hence, his conclusion that any indeterminacy results not 
from the open-ended character of the counterfactual test but from “defects in our empirical 
knowledge”225. 
 
At the other end of the spectrum, Stapleton advances the concept of “involvement”, instead 
of the narrower one of “necessity”, the information conveyed by the notion of “involvement” 
being “context-specific” and depending on the specification of the particular factor of interest 
to the legal system and consequently of the underlying interrogation that the concept of 
causation aims to unravel226. According to Stapleton, “lawyers should choose an 
interrogation underlying causal usage in the law that captures all ways in which the 
(specified) factor might be involved in the existence of the particular phenomenon in 
issue”227. This may extend beyond necessity and sufficiency and may identify simple 
“contribution” as a cause, “even where the factor is neither necessary nor sufficient for the 
existence of the particular phenomenon”228. Stapleton refutes the argument that the broader 
concept of “involvement” could lead to “overinclusiveness (that is too many causes)”, 
because of the “doctrinal filters” offered by the concept of causation in law and the 
requirements of proximate cause229, or one could also add “scope of the rule”, as it is 
adopted in some continental European systems and suggested by AG Kokott as an EU law 
rule in KONE AG, although this was not accepted by the CJEU,  
 
From this perspective, causation in fact should provide the requisite “width of coverage” that 
is needed to accommodate the regulatory strategies followed by the legal system in this 
context. If the aim of law’s intervention is to prevent harm, such project requires the legal 
system “to address all involved factors – even those that some might describe as mere 
conditions”230. Were the law to select a narrower interrogation underlying the causal 
language, this might have jeopardized the specific regulatory project. The “scope of the rule” 
doctrine would be a particularly salient factor in determining the “width of coverage” of the 
causation enquiry in law. The existence of “filtering devices”, such as proximate cause or the 
“scope of the rule” doctrine, enabling “the specification of a small finite number of factors 
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whose possible involvement in the existence of a particular phenomenon in the actual world 
is being examined”, distinguishes the causation inquiry in law from that undertaken in social 
sciences and/or metaphysics.  
 
By choosing to rely on a broad concept of the causal link, defined as “contribution”, the 
CJEU is able to assist the claimant(s) in putting forward a causation narrative. This broad 
conception may potentially also favour defendants, when these argue a pass on defence. 
While not being open-ended, this concept of causation remains extremely broad and offers 
considerable discretion to national judges to frame it according to the circumstances of the 
case and the requirements of their legal system. May be the “closure” of the system through 
the adoption of a “scope of the rule” doctrine (as suggested by Advocate General Kokott) or 
other alternatives is something that may be envisaged in the future, should a broad concept 
of causation lead to a flood of competition damages cases and difficulties as to the definition 
of the conceptual contours of the causal link. The experience gained in the meantime would 
be valuable, in particular in view of the complex economic evidence usually relied upon by 
litigants in this area of law. 
 
Although the Damages Directive and the EU courts have been reticent to engage in an 
extensive harmonization of the causation requirement, a more extensive harmonization 
approach was nevertheless followed with regard to situations of causal uncertainty that are 
generated by the existence of multiple tortfeasors. In this case, the Damages Directive 
provides for more harmonized rules. 
 
d. Beyond causation: The instrument of joint (solidary) and several liability 
Article 11 of the Damages Directive establishes the rule of joint and several liability of 
multiple tortfeasors for competition law damages, representing the choice of the EU 
legislator for a regime of several and joint liability instead of choosing to channel liability to 
one tortfeasor for the whole damage and then resolve the attribution issue by resorting to 
some sort of causal proportional liability rule. According to Article 11(1), “Member States 
shall ensure that undertakings which have infringed competition law through joint behaviour 
are jointly and severally liable for the harm caused by the infringement of competition law: 
each of those undertakings is bound to compensate for the harm in full, and the injured party 
has the right to require full compensation from any of them until he has been fully 
compensated”231. Hence, in a fact pattern where the damage was caused by the cumulative 
foreclosure effect created by the parallel networks of agreements with similar clauses, the so 
called Delimitis cumulative effects doctrine, all the undertakings whose network of contracts 
participated to this cumulative effect will be found liable, under the joint and several liability 
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doctrine232. Hence, each of the undertakings is bound to compensate for the harm in full, and 
the injured party may require full compensation from any of them. 
 
Article 11(4) requires Member States to ensure that an infringing undertaking may recover a 
contribution from any other infringing undertaking, the amount of which shall be determined 
in the light of their relative responsibility for the harm caused by the infringement of 
competition law. This right of contribution extends only to “infringing undertakings” and thus 
does not seem to cover the situation of a competitor not participating to the cartel, and thus 
not committing a competition law infringement, who may have benefitted from the higher 
cartel prices by charging higher prices to his consumers (umbrella customers). Hence, it is 
possible that, following Kone, umbrella customers may claim full compensation for the harm 
caused by the infringing undertakings (e.g. members of the cartel or found liable for having 
abused their collective dominant position), the latter not being able to recover a contribution, 
on the basis of Article 11(4) of the Directive, from a non-cartelist competitor benefitting from 
the umbrella price. This windfall profit (from the competition law infringement) may however 
be recovered on the basis of national rules on restitution (e.g. unjust enrichment), the 
Directive being silent on this issue. One may however claim that awarding recovery in this 
context will limit deterrence and might be indirectly incompatible, if not with the letter, at least 
with the spirit of the Directive, assuming that national courts have the obligation to interpret 
national law in conformity with an EU directive, even more so if the Damages Directive is 
interpreted as also covering actions for damages based on restitution233. Deterrence would 
favour a no contribution rule in this context, as it would have also been the case in the 
context of an action from an infringing undertaking against another infringing undertaking234. 
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 Case C-234/89, Stergios Delimitis v Henninger Bräu AG. [1991] ECR I-935: a combination of 
tying/exclusive purchasing agreements might infringe Article 101 TFEU if it would be difficult for competing 
suppliers to enter the market because of the cumulative effects of the networks of agreements by different 
suppliers in the market (the foreclosure effect of all the networks of agreements) and the supplier network to 
which the agreement under consideration formed part had a significant contribution to the foreclosure effect 
(contribution of the specific network of agreements to the foreclosure effect). 
233
 Case C-106/89, Marleasing SA v La Comercial Internacional de Alimentacion SA [1990] ECR I-4135. 
234
 A different approach has prevailed in the US, where the Supreme Court in its judgment in Texas Industries v. 
Radcliff Materials, 451 U.S. 630 (1981) affirmed the common law rule against contribution among competition 
law defendants and found that there was no indication that Congress considered contribution among joint 
violators under the US antitrust laws, leaving congressional action as the only avenue for those seeking to allow 
contribution. A tortfeasor who paid damages to a plaintiff is not entitled to contribution from other competition 
law tortfeasors, since each tortfeasor  remains  responsible for the entire loss and actions for contribution among 
co- defendants are barred in antitrust cases. Furthermore, where there have been settlements between the parties 
injured and some of the tortfeasors, only the actual amount of the settlements is deducted from the treble 
damages awards against the tortfeasors who have not settled who are also responsible for the part of the damage 
inflicted by the settling defendant which was not covered by the settlement. The no-contribution rule was 
originally adopted by the English courts for joint tortfeasors in Merryweather v. Nixan (1799) 101 Eng. Rep. 
1337 (K.B.), on the basis of the principle of ex turpi causa non oritur actio: out of a base (illegal or immoral) 
consideration, no action arises. At that time the term “joint tortfeasors” referred only to those defendants that 
have acted intentionally and in concert. It was later extended to all joint tortfeasors, even those that concurrently 
caused indivisible harm by negligence, although in this case the extent of the rule was limited by the courts. For 
a discussion, see J. S. Dillbary, Apportioning Liability Behind a Veil of Uncertainty, (2011) 62 Hastings Law 
Journal 1729-1792. In view of the harshness of the rule, the UK Parliament enacted the Law Reform (Married 
Women and Tortfeasors) Act in 1935, providing for a contribution rule among tortfeasors, followed by the Law 
Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act, 1945. Similarly in the US, many States have fashioned rules of 
contribution in one form or another in the first decades of the 20
th
 century. Yet, in  Texas Industries v. Radcliff 
Materials, the Supreme Court refused to follow that trend and adopt contribution for antitrust violators. For an 
analysis of the respective merits of the no contribution  or contribution rules in the US context, see generally 
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Yet, as it is clear from the recovery rule included in Article 11(4), fairness concerns, rather 
than deterrence, animate the EU rules applying in this context235. 
 
The contribution rule constitutes indeed a feature of tort law regimes in Europe. In the UK, 
the Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978 provides that “(a)ny person liable in respect of any 
damage suffered by another person may recover contribution from any other person liable in 
respect of the same damage (whether jointly with him or otherwise)”236. The above provision 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
W.M. Landes & R. Posner, Joint and Multiple Tortfeasors: An Economic Analysis, (1980) 9 Journal of Legal 
Studies 517-555 (noting that from an efficiency perspective, it is impossible to pronounce that no contribution is 
a more efficient rule than contribution, as the result “depends on the trade-off between the administrative cost 
savings under the former and the informational and insurance benefits under the latter”, although they also 
expressed the feeling that “a broad contribution rule is almost certainly less efficient than no contribution”); F. 
Easterbrook, W. Landes & R. Posner, Contribution Among Antitrust Defendants: A Legal and Economic 
Analysis, (1980) 23 Journal of Law and Economics 331-370 (finding that even if the no contribution rule leads 
to more deterrence, its efficiency “from an overall social standpoint” remains a difficult question as one should 
consider issues of risk aversion and legal error); M. Polinsky & S. Shavell, Contribution and Claim Reduction 
Among Antitrust Defendants: An Economic Analysis, (1981) 33 Stanford Law Review 447-471 (noting, among 
others, that a no contribution rule might be less efficient as it achieves deterrence by imposing greater risks on 
innocent parties and allocates liability imprecisely, thus discouraging some firms from engaging  in socially 
beneficial activities); L. A. Kornhauser & R. L. Revesz, Joint and Several Liability, in (M. Faure ed.) Tort Law 
and Economics (Edward Elgar, 2009), 109-134 (remarking that when it comes to fairness, joint and several 
liability with no contribution may place a disproportionate burden on the defendant with the smaller share of the 
liability); ABA, Antitrust Section, Contribution and Claim Reduction in Antitrust Litigation  (Monograph 11), 
(ABA: 1986) (highlighting, among other issues, the possible over-deterrence or under-deterrence effects that a 
contribution or a no contribution rule will have, depending on the nature of the antitrust violation and 
assumptions on the risk averse or risk seeking character of competition law infringers). In response to these 
harsh rules, firms engaged in or accused of price fixing often enter into judgment-sharing agreements, in which 
the firms agree to allocate financial responsibility for any private liability among them: for a discussion, see 
C.R. Leslie, Judgment-Sharing Agreements, (2009) 58(5) Duke Law Journal 747-825. Recently the US Antitrust 
Modernization Commission discussed a recommendation to US Congress to enact legislation allowing non-
settling defendants to seek contribution from other non-settling defendants and that would also permit non-
settling defendants to obtain reduction of the plaintiffs’ claims by the amount of the settlement(s) or the 
allocated share(s) of liability of the settling defendant(s), whichever amount is greater: See, Antitrust 
Modernization Commission, Report & Recommendation (April 2007), 18 (proposal 46), 243-244, 251-255. The 
AMC indeed noted (at 244) that “(t)he existing rules of joint and several liability without a right of contribution 
and only limited claim reduction have given rise to substantial criticism regarding fairness. These rules permit 
plaintiffs to settle with some defendants at an early stage for a relatively small amount of damages, leaving 
remaining, non-settling defendants potentially liable for nearly the entire damages caused by the joint conduct, 
trebled. As a result, these rules can cause a “race” to settle, potentially leaving defendants that had a small or no 
role in the overall anticompetitive scheme with disproportionately large potential liability”. Yet, no legislative 
initiative has been so far enacted by US Congress on this issue, thus indicating a divergence between the 
deterrence-oriented US no contribution rule and the fairness-oriented European contribution rule. For a 
discussion with regard to the European context, see M. Hviid & A. Medvedev, The Role of Contribution among 
Defendants in Private Antitrust Litigation, CCP Working Paper 08-3, available at 
http://competitionpolicy.ac.uk/documents/107435/107587/ccp08-3.pdf (noting that although the no contribution 
rule may lead to higher levels of aggregate damages and more information available to the private plaintiff, it 
has also the potential to “neuter any public leniency programme, thereby possibly reducing the number of cartels 
detected”). 
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 There are various options on offer: apart from the basic choice of a no contribution rule or a contribution 
rule, if the contribution rule option is selected there are various options regarding the dividing and apportioning 
of damages among a cluster of antitrust co-conspirators. According to the Supreme Court in Texas Industries v. 
Radcliff Materials, 451 U.S. 630 (1981),, “various formulae are suggested: damages may be allocated according 
to market shares, relative profits, sales to the particular plaintiff, the role in the organization and operation of the 
conspiracy, or simply pro rata, assessing an equal amount against each participant on the theory that each one is 
equally liable for the injury caused by collective action”. 
236
 Section 1(1) of the UK Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978. According to Section 2(2) of the Act, “[…] 
the amount of the contribution recoverable from any person shall be such as may be found by the court to be just 
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applies not only where there is judgment against the defendant, but also where the 
defendant has settled the claim237. 
 
At the European level, the Draft Common Frame of Reference employs the terminology 
“solidary liability” (instead of joint and several liability) and provides for a default rule of equal 
sharing for solidary debtors [Art. III.-4:106(1)], “unless different shares of liability are more 
appropriate having regard to all the circumstances of the case and in particular to fault or to 
the extent to which a source of danger for which one of them was responsible contributed to 
the occurrence or extent of the damage” [Art. III.-4:106(2)], thus stipulating a special rule for 
cases of solidary liability resulting from causing the same damage238. It is also provided that 
“(a) solidary debtor who has performed more than that debtor’s share has a right to recover 
the excess from any of the other debtors to the extent of each debtor’s unperformed share, 
together with a share of any costs reasonably incurred [Art. III.-4:107]. Although these rules 
are not binding, they provide a reference point for the multiple national rules on this issue. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
The emergence of actions for damages as one of the main forms of competition law 
enforcement in Europe is a recent phenomenon. The issue of the standing of indirect 
purchasers has been a primary focus for legal commentators, as is attested by the number 
of studies published on this topic. The most recent book-length studies published on 
competition law damages typically dedicate a chapter on standing issues239. This choice may 
have been influenced by the debate in the United States (U.S), which has focused 
predominately on this issue, since the Supreme Court barred indirect purchasers from 
pursuing treble damage claims under Clayton Act § 4 in Illinois Brick, certain limited 
exceptions set aside240. The US solution and the debate over indirect purchasers may be 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
and equitable having regard to the extent of that person’s responsibility for the damage in question”. It is also 
mentioned ion Section 1(3) that “the person from whom the contribution is sought shall not by virtue of any 
contribution awarded […] be required to pay in respect of the damage a greater amount than the amount of those 
damages as so limited or reduced”, for instance by “any limit imposed by or under any enactment or by any 
agreement made before the damage occurred” or by “any corresponding limit or reduction under the law of a 
country outside England and Wales”. For a discussion of the English law of contribution see, C. Mitchel, The 
Law of Contribution and Reimbursement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). 
237
 Section 1(4) of the UK Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978. 
238
 As it is remarked in the notes to Art. III.-4:106, “(t)he sharing of liability for damages between those 
responsible for the same damage is done in different ways in different legal systems. Sometimes it is done 
according to the degree of seriousness of the wrongdoing of those involved [see for instance, in French, Greek, 
Danish, Polish jurisprudence] […] Elsewhere causal participation is what matters [see for instance in German, 
Austrian, Italian, Spanish jurisprudence]”. Finally, under English law (Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978) 
the matter is left to the discretion of the judge. 
239
 See, for instance, D. Mc Fadden, The Private Enforcement of Competition Law in Ireland (Hart Pub. 2013); 
D. Ashton & D. Henry, Competition Damages Actions in the EU – Law and Practice (Edward Elgar, 2013). 
240
 Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977). Indirect purchasers are not however barred from seeking 
injunctive relief under Clayton Act § 16, provided they meet the other requirements set in this context: Cargill, 
Inc. v. Monfort of Colorade Inc., 479 U.S. 104 (1986). Some States have nevertheless provided standing to 
indirect purchasers by passing “Illinois Brick repealer” statutes, a practice accepted by the Supreme Court. 
These statutes cover approximately 70% of the US population: E. L. Cramer & D.C. Simons, Parties entitled to 
pursue a claim in A.A. Foer & R.M. Stutz (eds.), Private Enforcement of Antitrust Law in the United States 
(Edward Elgar, 2012), 64-94, 80-83. Passage of the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) of 2005 may direct some 
of this litigation, when it concerns small claims multi-state, to the federal courts, if it was introduced after the 
implementation of CAFA. CAFA proceeds to an amendment of 28 USC §1332(d) and establishes federal 
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explained by the specific function played by private enforcement in the US, its overall 
architecture aiming to “provide a mechanism for wider public regulatory and observance 
goals”, in particular deterrence, thus going beyond compensation for loss, a feature that also 
explains the various specificities of the US system of private enforcement (e.g. cost rules), in 
comparison to the role of private enforcement in other parts of the world241. In contrast, in the 
European civil justice systems, the role of private enforcement has principally, but not 
exclusively, been that of providing compensation and operating as an instrument of 
corrective justice. Hence, issues of standing, as any other dimension of a tort law system 
cannot be determined on the sole basis of deterrence considerations. The competition law 
field is no exception and the EU Courts, followed by the European Commission, have 
underlined the goal of compensation as the principal, but again non-exclusive, aim of private 
enforcement in EU competition law. The choice for a system of single, and not multiple, 
damages attest to that normative choice, even if there was evidence that double damages 
might have been a more efficient option, from a deterrence perspective but also from a 
mixed deterrence-corrective justice perspective (e.g. double damages only for cartel 
cases)242.  
 
In a regime based on corrective justice considerations, causation requirements will tend to 
play a predominant role in regulating the damages claims brought forward. By relying on the 
tort law systems of the various Member States and avoiding any harmonization of these 
rules at the EU level, the EU legislator and the Court of Justice, made the choice of 
promoting inter-jurisdictional competition, under the framework of course of the principles of 
equivalence and effectiveness, in particular the second one, which is interpreted as aiming 
to facilitate damages actions. Some limited harmonization of evidential presumptions and 
procedural requirements, as well as the exclusion of national rules that may deny the right of 
the parties harmed by the competition law infringement to receive compensation also 
ensures the effectiveness of the remedy. Yet, the contours of the requirement of causal link 
are left to the interpretative work of the national courts, in view of their respective tort law 
doctrines on causation and the lack of a proper EU tort law. The study examined the 
different solutions that have emerged in these various national tort law systems in order to 
cope with situations of causal uncertainty that inevitably arise in competition law cases, in 
view of the complexity of the commercial environment and the multiple factors influencing 
markets. It transpired from the discussion that it is only in circumstances in which national 
tort law systems may not guarantee effectively the right to compensation of the victims of 
competition law infringements that EU law intervenes, for instance dealing with damages 
caused by multiple tortfeasors through provisions on joint (solidary) and several liability or by 
instituting causal presumptions. The promotion of the inter-jurisdictional competition that lies 
in the background of the choice not to harmonize the causation requirements should 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
jurisdiction for class actions in which there is minimal diversity between the parties and the matter in 
controversy exceeds $5 million. 
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 C. Hodges, S. Vogenauer & M. Tulibacka (eds.), The Costs and Funding of Civil Litigation: A Comparative 
Perspective (Hart Pub. 2010), pp. 3-186. 
242
 Report for the European Commission, Making antitrust damages actions more effective in the EU: welfare 
impact and potential scenarios (December 21, 2007) available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/files_white_paper/impact_study.pdf  , pp. 562-566 
(scenario 1: double damages for all competition cases) & pp. 579-594 (Scenario 2: double damages only for 
cartel cases). 
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therefore be understood as aiming to guarantee a more effective enforcement of the rights of 
the victims of competition law infringements, thus leading to the need to adopt an 
instrumental approach when implementing causation requirements in competition law related 
damages cases. 
